Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness - Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations by Stennek, Johan & Verboven, Frank


















Working Paper No. 556, 2001 
 
Merger Control and Enterprise Competitiveness 
- Empirical Analysis and Policy Recommendations 
 




















IUI, The Research Institute of Industrial Economics 
P.O. Box 5501 
SE-114 85 Stockholm  
Sweden 1
Merger Control and Enterprise
Competitiveness




Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm and CEPR
Frank Verboven





1.1 ECONOMIES OF SCALE............................................................................................................... 3





2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF SCALE ECONOMIES ............................................................................... 10


















2.3 EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF SCALE ECONOMIES........................................................................ 32
 	





























3.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF PASS-ON OF COST SAVINGS..................................................................... 45

































































4.2 THE EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK.................................................................................................. 80













This report studies the importance of efficiency gains from horizontal mergers. A
general theme throughout this report is that efficiency gains, and their pass-on to
consumers, may vary substantially from merger to merger. For this reason it seems
appropriate to reconsider current practice in European merger control, which does not
allow the merging parties to appeal to an efficiency defence. Our report provides a
detailed examination of two main parts of an efficiency analysis. The first chapter
considers the presence of efficiencies from mergers, with a focus on economies of
scale. The second chapter consider the pass-on of efficiencies to consumers in the
form of lower prices.
 
Cost savings, or other efficiency gains, are necessary for horizontal mergers to benefit
consumers and the economy as a whole. Cost is also important way to increase
enterprise competitiveness. One of the most important sources of cost savings is
economies of scale.
The aim of chapter 2 is to investigate to what extent mergers are likely to generate
cost savings through better exploitation of scale economies. This information is an
important input to the discussion about the pros and cons of introducing an efficiency
defence in the Merger Regulation. For this purpose we review the theoretical and
empirical literature on scale economies. Although this literature contains information
that is useful for the appropriate design of merger control, many issues are unsolved.
A second purpose of this review is therefore to carefully point out where the existing
literature is still insufficient.
We begin our analysis with an intuitive discussion of the sources of scale economies
(section 2.2.1). A production process is said to have scale economies if the unit cost of
production is lower when more is produced. There are several sources of scale
economies, such as mechanisation and specialisation achieved through division of
labour. Without constructing a full typology, we compile a “checklist” of the most
common sources of scale economies.
We also draw a sharp distinction between technologically determined economies of
scale and overheads such as advertising and R&D. Due to state of economic
knowledge, we are forced to primarily focus this overview on the first type of scale
economies. However, we also argue that this state of knowledge is very unsatisfactory.
Advertising and R&D are important in most European industries with a high
concentration.
Next, we define the term scale economies more rigorously (section 2.2.2). This
section is an important input for discussing the relationship between mergers and
production costs, and also for understanding the empirical literature. In the economic
literature there exists two different definitions of scale economies, one based on the
so-called production function, the other based on the so-called cost function. We
argue that for the purpose of analysing efficiency gains from mergers, it is vital to use4
the concept based on the cost function. The reason is that the exploitation of some
scale economies (e.g. mechanisation) requires changing the factor proportions. Such
gains are only captured by the concept based on the cost function. The primary
complications in defining scale economies arises when firms produce more than one
product. In this case, there may exist overall diseconomies of scale even if there are
(product specific) economies of scale for all individual products. The reason is that
there may exist so-called diseconomies of scope. Another complication is that the
minimum efficient scale of a firm depends on the mix in witch the firm produces the
different products.
We then discuss the theoretical relation between mergers and scale economies (section
2.2.3). That is, if production is characterised by scale economies, under what
conditions can they be exploited by means of merger? In part, this question was
analysed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
1 However, a limitation in their analysis is that
they focus on the case when the capital stock in each plant is fixed—the short run.
Drawing on the theory of sub-additivity, we  extend their analysis to include the effect
of mergers on cost in the long run—when firms can adjust their capital stock freely.
In the single product case, the relation is rather straightforward. Economies of scale
(in the relevant range) are sufficient, but not necessary, for a merger to reduce cost. In
the multiple-product case, the primary finding is that that the relation between scale
economies and mergers is rather complex. Even if there are unexploited scale
economies, mergers may well raise rather than reduce cost. This implies that even if
firms can demonstrate the existence of scale economies (in the relevant range) to
competition authorities, allowing a merger does not necessarily lead to cost savings. A
positive finding is that one can establish different sets of sufficient conditions for
mergers to reduce cost. These conditions are based on the notion of sub-additivity of
the cost function. For example, if there are product specific economies of scale for all
products, and there are economies of scope, then a merger reduces cost. In effect,
these theoretical results show that in evaluating the effect of a merger on cost,
competition authorities need to take into account both product specific economies of
scale and potential economies of scope. However, in order to make these conditions
more precise additional analysis, similar to that undertaken by Farrell and Shapiro for
the short-run case, is needed.
Using the concept of sub-additivity, we are also able to say if a full merger is the best
way to restructure production in order to produce the given output as cheaply as
possible. This is important since there are often several alternatives, short of a full
merger, that may reduce cost without imposing all the anti-competitive effects of a
horizontal merger. Antitrust authorities are often required to make such a broad
evaluation of mergers. Only cost savings that are merger specific should qualify as an
efficiency defence.
Farrell’s and Shapiro’s short-run analysis and the long-run analysis undertaken in this
report are complements. The first analysis considers the extreme case when the capital
stock in every plant is fixed. The second analysis considers the other extreme case
when firms freely can adjust their capital. In the long run, cost savings are larger than
in the short run. Hence, the latter form of analysis is more likely to produce a positive
picture of the effects of the merger. As a consequence, antitrust authorities may reach
                                                          
1 Their analysis is described in Röller, Stennek and Verboven (1999).5
different decisions, depending on whether they consider the long run or the short run
effects. To complicate the picture further, it is likely that capital adjustments require
different amounts of time in different industries. Therefore, if the antitrust authority
evaluates the effects of the merger within the first two-year period, long-run analysis
may be relevant for some industries and short-run analysis may be relevant for other
industries.
2 In sum:












































In section 2.3, we review the empirical literature on economies of scale. We both
provide a brief overview of empirical estimates of scale economies in several
industries, and discuss the methodologies that are used. However, since many of these
studies are rather old, and since scale economies in many industries are likely to
change over time, as a result of technological development, we do not attempt to
provide a detailed account of the measurement of scale economies for all industries.
Rather, the main purpose is to extract the general conclusions, from this literature, that
are relevant for the discussion of an efficiency defence in merger control.
The primary finding is that the exploitation of scale economies is a source of
substantial cost savings in some, but not all, industries. Economies of scale are often
present at low volumes of output, and exhausted at larger volumes. In our view, the
empirical results have an important implication for merger policy. The variability of
scale economies across industries and different output volumes support the idea that
cost savings should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, i.e. an efficiency defence.
Moreover, the empirical literature shows that concentration in many industries has
gone further than motivated by scale economies alone. Thus, in evaluating mergers it
is important that only scale economies in the relevant range should be used as a
defence for a horizontal merger. In sum:










































In order for antitrust authorities to take cost savings related to scale economies into
account, they need some methodology to assess the importance of these economies.
Therefore, we also provide a short introduction to the empirical methodologies that
have been used to estimate economies of scale. Essentially, three different methods
have been used to study the relationship between size and unit cost. The econometric
approach uses statistical techniques to analyse cost-output data from some collection
of firms. The mathematical programming approach is similar in that it also analyses
cost-output data, but using linear programming. The engineering approach relies on
interviews with engineers who design new production units.
                                                          
2 Unfortunately, the empirical literature does not report any measures of how long time that is required
in order to achieve scale economies in different industries. Another important issue that is unexplored in
the literature is the possible differences in time required for achieving scale economies by means of
merger and by means of internal growth.6
In our view, all of these methodologies are useful for antitrust authorities, albeit in
different ways. The already existing studies based on the econometric and
mathematical programming approaches have produced useful “background
knowledge.” Whenever a case has to be decided concerning some industry, these
studies can give a first hint if scale economies are important in that particular industry.
What is the order of magnitude of potential cost savings? Is it reasonable to carry out
a more detailed study?
However, for several reasons the econometric approach is probably not suitable for
the antitrust authorities to carry out such more detailed investigation. The main reason
is data limitation. In order to estimate scale economies, cost and output data also from
firms not participating in the merger is necessary. Another reason is that the
econometric approach does not identify the sources of scale economies, which is
important in order for assessing merger specificity. Estimates of scale economies do
not indicate the time it takes for a merger to achieve cost savings related to scale
economies. In contrast, the engineering approach should lend itself for such more
detailed studies in particular cases. In particular, the engineering approach may supply
an “incremental analysis,” that is focus on the factors that will be affected by the
merger. In sum:

















































The second chapter analyses the pass-on of cost savings on consumer prices. Price
effects are important for two related but distinct reasons. First, assessing price effects
is essential for evaluating changes in consumer welfare, which is often the first or
main objective of merger control. Second, understanding the price effects is essential
to evaluate changes in the merging firms’ competitive position. Indeed, if a merger
leads to a reduction in price, the merging firms typically realize an increase in their
market share. In contrast, if a merger leads to a price increase, the merging firms are
likely to experience a shrinking market share. While the merging firms’ profits may
still increase in this case, this would be caused by increased market power and thus
not by an increased competitiveness.
The effect of a merger on price may be decomposed into two separate components.
First, there is the price increase stemming from an increase in (unilateral or collusive)
market power, holding the merging firms’ costs constant. Most theories of oligopoly
predict such a price increase. Second, there is a possible price reduction stemming
from the  cost savings due to the merger. Cost savings may be passed on to consumers
if it is the marginal cost that is reduced. As we explain in detail in the report, also
some conditions on demand must be satisfied, in order for cost savings to be passed
on to consumers.7
The total price effect from the merger is negative if pass-on of marginal cost savings
is sufficiently high to outweigh the market power effects.
3 Only in the extreme case of
no pass-on a merger will necessarily increase price no matter how large the marginal
cost savings are. More generally, the greater the pass-on, the more likely a merger is
going to decrease price in the presence of cost savings. For example, if 50 percent of
the cost savings are passed on to consumers, then a merger decreases price if the
realized cost savings are at least twice the percentage amount of the price effects from
increased market power. If cost savings are fully passed on to consumers, then a
merger decreases price if the realized cost savings are at least the same percentage
amount as the price effects from increased market power.
These examples illustrate the importance of understanding the degree of pass-on to
evaluate the full price effects from mergers. Since pass on is not a constant, but varies
between markets and over time, several questions must be addressed. What are the
relevant determinants of pass-on? Do technological conditions affect the degree of
pass-on? What is the role played by competition? How important is the distinction
between pass-on of firm-specific and industry-wide cost savings? What is the
empirical evidence regarding pass-on? We take up these questions in this chapter with
the purpose of obtaining a better understanding into the role of efficiencies in mergers.
In a first section we review the theoretical determinants of pass-on of cost savings. We
begin by reviewing pass-on of industry wide cost savings, i.e. cost savings realized by
all firms in the industry. Under perfect competition, the price elasticity of demand and
the shape of the marginal cost curve are the main determinants. As consumers become
more price inelastic, and as the supply curve becomes more elastic (little capacity
constraints) pass-on of industry wide cost savings will be more complete. If supply is
perfectly elastic (no capacity constraints), pass-on of industry-wide cost savings is
complete under perfect competition. The picture is different under monopoly or
oligopoly. In this case, pass-on of industry wide cost savings may be incomplete even
if supply is perfectly elastic. The reason is that firms have market power and charge
markups which depend on the price elasticity of consumer demand. In the “typical”
case, consumers become more price sensitive as the price increases. If this is the case,
then pass-on will be incomplete. This is especially true in the monopoly case.
Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that even in the monopoly case (or the dominant
firm case) firms pass on at least part of the cost savings onto consumers. As the
number of firms increases, pass-on of industry wide cost savings generally becomes
more complete.
Next we emphasize the crucial importance of distinguishing between industry-wide
and firm-specific pass-on. An understanding of firm-specific pass-on is especially
relevant in the context of mergers, since it are typically only the merging firms who
benefit from cost reductions. Nevertheless, both policy makers and the merging
parties often confuse firm-specific pass-on with industry-wide pass-on. Our analysis
shows that firm-specific pass-on is generally less than industry wide pass-on. For
example, when firms are identical, firm-specific pass-on is equal to industry-wide
pass-on divided by the number of firms in the industry. Hence the more firms there
                                                          
3 Assume that the merger tends to increase price by dP/P percent as a result of the first effect. Then, for
the net effect to be non-positive, it is necessary that  (dc/c)(dP/dc)(c/p)≤ -dP/P, where (dc/c) is the
percentage cost reduction, and β =(dP/dc)(c/p) is the pass-on elasticity. The pass-on elasticity indicates
by how many percent the price would be reduced if cost is reduced by one percent.8
are, the lower is the degree of firm-specific pass-on. When firms are not identical, no
general results on firm-specific pass-on are available. Nevertheless, it is clear that the
market share of the firm who realizes the cost reduction matters. On the one hand, a
high market share of the cost-reducing firm makes the cost saving close to an
industry-wide cost saving and thus makes pass-on more complete. On the other hand,
a high market share also means a lot of market power, which may provide an incentive
to pass on incompletely. The results of these forces is that pass-on in an industry is
typically the largest for firms with intermediate market share, i.e. not the very small
firms but also not the dominant firms.














































In the second section of this chapter we review the empirical literature on pass-on. We
start by reviewing the rich empirical literature on tax incidence, intermediate goods
price transmission and exchange rate pass-through. The empirical results vary
sometimes substantially from sector to sector. Yet it is still possible to make some
empirical generalizations. It seems fair to say that the literature on the effects of excise
taxes and intermediate goods prices finds that pass-on is close to 100 percent, at least
when one considers a sufficiently large time horizon (10 weeks or more). The
literature on exchange rate pass-through tends to find incomplete pass-on, of an order
of magnitude of 60-70 percent. Part of this literature also relates the extent of
exchange rate pass-though to the market share of the exporting sector. Finally, the
scarce literature on firm-specific pass-on finds a relatively low degree of pass-on,
especially when the market share of the firms is small. The estimates are in the range
of 10-20 percent.
This evidence makes clear the empirical importance of considering firm-specific
rather than industry-wide pass-on. While industry-wide pass-on is more or less
complete, firm-specific pass-on may be substantially smaller. At the same time,
however, it is not sensible to draw strong general conclusions about the extent of firm-
specific pass-on. The extent of firm-specific pass-on is likely to vary substantially
from merger to merger, and it seems unreasonable to aim for a general presumption on
the extent of firm-specific pass-on. In particular, there is a central role for market
share in explaining firm-specific pass-on. Low firm-specific pass-on may be due to
low market shares; yet in those cases the market power effects from mergers may also
be low.







































































Our empirical review does not only stress the importance of assessing pass-on on a
case-by-case basis; it has also introduced several possible methodologies for assessing
pass-on of cost savings, both reduced form and structural approaches. We hope our
analysis makes it clear that the methodology lends itself quite well for a fast9
implementation, as is required in merger cases. This is especially true for the reduced
form analysis, yet also structural approaches could be feasible in some cases. The
major potential constraint to assess pass-on in merger cases is thus not necessarily in
the application of sophisticated technical analysis. Rather, it is important to make sure
that the data required for the analysis are collected from the parties in an efficient way.
















































For a horizontal merger to benefit consumers and the economy as a whole it must
reduce the firms’ costs or generate some other form of efficiency gain. Cost savings
are also one of many important determinants of enterprise competitiveness. One of the
most important sources of cost savings is economies of scale.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate to what extent mergers are likely to generate
cost savings through better exploitation of scale economies. This information is an
important input to the discussion about the pros and cons of introducing an efficiency
defence in the Merger Regulation. For this purpose we review the theoretical and
empirical literature on scale economies. As will be demonstrated below, this literature
contains information that is useful for the appropriate design of merger control. As
always, however, there are more questions than answers. A second purpose of this
review is therefore to carefully point out where the existing literature is still
insufficient.
The first part is theoretical (section 2.2). We begin our analysis with an intuitive
discussion of the sources of scale economies (section 2.2.1). Without constructing a
full typology, we compile a “checklist” of the most common sources of scale
economies, such as mechanisation and specialisation achieved through division of
labour. We also draw a sharp distinction between technologically determined
economies of scale and overheads such as advertising and R&D. Next, we define the
term scale economies more rigorously (section 2.2.2). This section is an important
input for discussing the relationship between mergers and production costs, and also
for presenting the empirical literature. The primary complication in defining scale
economies arises when firms produce more than one product.
We then discuss the theoretical relation between mergers and scale economies (section
2.2.3). That is, if production is characterised by scale economies, under what
conditions can they be exploited by means of merger? Drawing on the theory of sub-
additivity, we analyse the effect of mergers on cost in the long run—when firms can
adjust their capital stock freely. Our main conclusion is that theoretical analysis can
establish the conditions under which mergers generate cost savings, related to scale
economies, in the long run. Such conditions may also include a test for merger-
specificity. To make these conditions operational for antitrust authorities, more
research is needed, however.
In section 2.3, we review the empirical literature on economies of scale. We both
provide a brief overview of empirical estimates of scale economies in several
industries, and discuss the methodologies that are used. However, since many of these
studies are rather old, and since scale economies in many industries are likely to
change over time, as a result of technological development, we do not attempt to
provide a detailed account of the measurement of scale economies for all industries.
Rather, the main purpose is to extract the general conclusions, from this literature, that
are relevant for the discussion of an efficiency defence in merger control. Our main11
finding is that the variability of scale economies across industries supports the idea
that cost savings should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. We also argue that the
methods used in the economic literature should be useful also in antitrust cases.
The summary and conclusions from the theoretical part is found in section 2.2.4, and
for the empirical part in section 2.3.5.
 '!()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2.2.1 Sources of Scale Economies
A production process has scale economies if the unit cost of production is lower when
more is produced. Scale economies may be product-specific, that is associated with
the volume of a single product produced and sold; plant-specific, that is associated
with the total output (of possibly many different products) of an entire plant; and firm-
specific (or multiple-plant) economies, associated with a firm’s operations of several
plants.
Economies of scale may also be attributed to the different activities performed by the
firm, such as production, purchasing, marketing and R&D. For reasons to be
explained below, it is convenient to treat economies of scale arising from advertising
and R&D as different from other “production economies.” Therefore production





 !*"(.   There are many different reasons for why unit costs may
decrease with volume. We list and explain some of the most commonly mentioned
examples. The presentation is not intended to be complete, and the list should not be
taken as a typology of scale economies.
1.  5)
*	
.  In some industries some 

 are indivisible. The
most well known example is the critical mass in nuclear power generation. At the
critical mass, some amount of electricity is generated. Producing less than this
amount of electricity means that the cost of the indivisible input is spread over
fewer units of output, implying a higher cost per unit of electricity. There are also
many examples of indivisible 

1
. Starting up a production run requires that
machines are fine-tuned for the process. If this set up cost is spread over many
units, average cost is reduced. Some management and marketing tasks have to be
done independent of the scale of operation. Again, the more units produced, the
lower is the cost per unit.
2.  	
6
.  Division of labour and specialisation is an important source of
scale economies. A production process may require 100 different tasks. If the firm
has 5 employees each must perform 20 tasks on average. If the firm has 1000
employees, no individual will be required to perform more than one, and all may
become more skilled at what they are doing—a specialist. Specialisation may be
both “horizontal” into different production tasks and “vertical” into production
and management tasks. Specialisation may be an important part of multiple-plant
economies. That is, if production of different products is allocated to different12
plants, specialisation can be driven further than if all products are produced within
one plant.
3.  	 


  Producing at a larger scale may make it meaningful to let a
machine do some tasks. However, at a low volume the machine may perhaps only
be used part of the time, and not pay its cost (indivisibility). The larger the
volumes the more specialised the tools can be used. Also parts can be transferred






.  A manufacturer may need to keep one machine in reserve so
that a breakdown does not interrupt production. Assume for example that a
delivery failure of at most one percent is acceptable. Assume also that a machine
produces ten units if it works. Then, having just one machine does not enable the
firm to write any contracts that satisfy the failure threshold. However, with two






.  In many industries, the output of a processing unit tends to
be roughly proportional to the volume of the unit, while the amount of materials
and construction work is linked to the surface area of the unit’s reaction chambers,
storage tanks, connecting pipes, and so on. Since the area of a sphere varies as the
two-thirds power of volume, there are considerable scale economies to be gained.
6.  8	
*.  Economies of scale have an important dynamic dimension.
There is considerable empirical support for the so-called learning curve, which
shows that unit cost falls with cumulative output.
! '%($
)
!+(.   Traditional economic analysis has concentrated on single-
product firms. But, in reality, most businesses produce many products, and many
antitrust issues involve only these enterprises. In recent years, economists and
policymakers dealing with antitrust issues have increasingly recognised the need for a
theory that can be used to evaluate the efficiency of market structures in industries
dominated by a few firms operating in a diverse range of markets. For such firms,
conventional concepts such as economies of scale do not adequately capture the
complexity of the situation.
5 The new literature has introduced as a complement to the
old concept of scale economies, the new concept of “economies of scope,” which
measures the cost advantages to firms of providing a large number of diversified
products as against specialising in the production of a single output.
1.  9.  Marshallian joint production exists if one or more factors of
production are public input. That is, once acquired for use in producing one good,
they are costlessly available for use in the production of others (up to some limit).
For example, crude oil is a public input to producing petrol and asphalt. Similarly,
certain tasks may be public tasks. For example, if the production of two outputs
requires the same input, then the acquisition of these inputs may be cheaper if
performed within the same firm. The reason for this may be both due to increased




.  Indivisible input or tasks may not only result in economies of
scale, but also in scope economies. Assembly line production with human labour
                                                          
4 See Mulligan (1983).
5 Bailey and Friedlander (1982).13
is often economical for single-product runs of large scale. Combinations of robots
and computer-controlled machine tools bring the benefits of large “scale” to the
production of even small batches, also when demand for every particular product
variety is small. Here it is the robot’s ability to switch form one task to another
that counts. The robot production line has the flexibility to handle a variety of
separate products, and makes it possible to take advantage of the economies
associated with automation.
3.  4	'1.   In the aviation industry, the cost of providing a seat is much lower
on big planes than on small planes. This provides an incentive for airlines to
organise the provision of services by offering a networking arrangement involving
one-stop service. Individuals with a variety of destinations are boarded on a single
larger plane. Planes from a variety of origins then stop at a central airport at
approximately the same time. The passengers to each of the destinations are then
combined, again making it possible to use larger planes. If one firm is more
efficient in co-ordinating the scheduling of services to a variety of city-pair




   Multiple-product firms may be more cost efficient than
combinations of single-product firms when several industries require similar
know-how but there are transaction difficulties affecting the transfer that know-





  -(.,*-%    There are many reasons for why vertical
integration or disintegration may affect the costs of production. For an overview of the
economic literature on vertical integration, see Perry (1989). The aim of the present
survey is to discuss efficiency gains associated with horizontal mergers. For such
mergers, the degree of vertical integration remains constant. For this reason we will
not discuss the economies and diseconomies associated with vertical integration. The
reason for this limitation is that vertical mergers and horizontal mergers have very
different effects on both competition and costs. This limitation obviously means that
the conclusions drawn from this report are only valid for horizontal mergers.
/%$(! '%($
 )
 !*"(.   While economies of scale may be common in many
industries, especially at low levels of volume, there are also good reasons to believe
that for large firms the opposite can be true: a reduction of the scale of a large firm
may lower unit cost. In that case there exists diseconomies of scale. What are the






. Any firm must have some individual who assumes
executive authority and responsibility. This individual has a limited time and
cognitive capacity. At the same time, a large plant or firm is more difficult to
manage than a small plant or firm. Thus, the larger the firm becomes, the more







. If a firm produces more it must sell more implying that it
may be necessary to reach out to more distant customers. Thus, including
transportation costs, there may be dis-economies to plant size. The importance of
transportation costs as a check to scale economies depends on the technological
                                                          
6 See Bailey and Friedlander (1982).
7 See Teece (1980).14
level in transportation. The more efficient transportation is, the more profitable it
is to exploit economies of scale.
3.  31	
	
. There exists psychological evidence that shows that workers
become less satisfied with their jobs in larger plants.
8
Since the sources of economies of scale become less important at a large scale, the
sources of diseconomies of scale become especially relevant at large levels of
production.
9
Several of the above points reveal that a useful understanding of economies and
diseconomies of scale and scope requires research going behind the neo-classical
production function theory. Is knowledge sharing a valid argument for a conglomerate
merger? To analyse that issue requires an analysis of the relative efficiency with
which knowledge can be transferred between organisations and within organisations.
Unfortunately, there does not exist any research showing which effects that are most
important in different industries. The reason for this shortcoming is that most
economic research, both theoretical and empirical, views the technology as given.
There are few studies trying to go behind the production function and explain its
properties. (An exception is given by the theoretical studies deriving decreasing
returns to scale as a result of loss of control.) Similarly, no research has been
undertaken allowing us to identify which types of mergers that generate the different
types of scale economies.
2.2.1.2 Advertising and R&D
In recent times, the economic literature has started to draw a sharp distinction between
technologically determined economies of scale and overheads such as advertising and
R&D. The above discussion of scale economies concerns the first type:
technologically determined economies of scale. The important point about these scale
economies, for example economies due to mechanisation, is that they are given by the
firms’ technological knowledge, and that they thus are fixed at any point in time.
Merger policy may affect the extent to which such scale economies can be exploited
by the firms. Merger policy does not, however, affect the existence of such scale
economies.
There will also be economies of scale in advertising if some minimum amount of
public exposure is needed before a sales campaign makes any impression at all on the
public. The cost of this minimum amount of advertising is a fixed cost—the same, no
matter how much the firm sells. Like any fixed cost, it will create a region of
economies of scale in which the fixed advertising cost is spread over more and more
units of output. Similarly, there may be a minimum amount of R&D that is needed
before production can start. Again, spreading this fixed cost over a larger volume,
reduces unit cost.
10
A merger may eliminate the duplication of certain R&D (and advertising) activities
and, the production of the different products may benefit from knowledge sharing.
                                                          
8 See Scherer and Ross (1990).
9 See Teece (1980) for a discussion of less easily quantifiable sources of economies of scope, for
example managerial expertise, a good financial rating and a sales staff.
10 Another issue is that there may exist scale economies internally in these activities. There is some
evidence that the average cost of advertising falls as its volume increases (Martin, 1993).15
The crucial question is: should such elimination of duplicated R&D activities be
counted as cost saving, and to be used as an efficiency defence?
The complicating factor is that advertising and R&D outlays are not fixed to the firms.
Rather, they are choice variables to the firms. The firms actively use advertising and
R&D outlays as competitive weapons. Their levels are determined in response to for
example the size of the market and the intensity of price competition.
11 Thus, a merger
will not only allow knowledge sharing. It will also affect the firms’ incentives to
undertake R&D activities and to produce new knowledge. Potentially, a merger may
induce an anti-competitive reduction in the amount of R&D.
Unfortunately, however, the economic literature has only to a little degree studied the
effect of mergers in industries where advertising and R&D are important. As a result it
is not clear how one should treat the endogenous scale economies that are an
inalienable aspect of such industries. On the one hand, one may argue that an
efficiency defence should take into account the fact that a merger may allow
advertising and R&D outlays to be spread over larger volumes. The argument is clear:
lower unit cost is good for welfare. On the other hand, by doing so, merger policy will
affect the firms’ incentives to undertake R&D and to advertise their products. On this
point, the arguments are not clear. We do not know exactly how competition policy
will affect the firms’ incentives for advertising and R&D, and we do not understand
the welfare consequences of changing the firms’ incentives in these respects.
12
However, this state of the art is very unfortunate since it is the industries that are
characterised by high advertising or R&D intensities that are highly concentrated in
the EU. Thus, it is in these industries that horizontal mergers are more likely to raise
competitive concerns. Among the 20 most concentrated (3-digit level) industries in
the EU (industries where the five largest firms’ aggregate market share is over 33.3%,
e.g. optical instruments, computers and tobacco) 16 are characterised by either high
advertising or R&D intensity. Among the 25 least concentrated (3-digit level)
industries in the EU (industries where the five largest firms’ aggregate market share is
lower than 10%, e.g. wooden furniture and clothing) none is characterised by high
advertising or R&D intensity.
13
Nevertheless, due to the lack of economic knowledge, the following discussion must
be primarily confined to the case of exogenous scale economies (in the same way as
                                                          
11 See Sutton (1991, 1998). To illustrate the crucial difference between endogenous and exogenous
(sunk) costs, consider the different effects that these costs have on industry structure. The equilibrium
level of concentration declines with the ratio of market size to technologically determined setup costs
and rises with the toughness of price competition. Intuitively, the larger the market is, the more firms
can cover the (exogenously given) setup costs, and thus the more firms are induced to enter. This
relationship brakes down for endogenous setup costs. By incurring greater advertising or R&D costs a
firm can raise the perceived quality of its products thereby enhancing the demand for these products.
Competition between the firms involves an escalation of outlays by firms and so lead to higher sunk
costs being incurred. Moreover, the larger the market, and thus the larger the potential profits are, the
greater the incentive the firms have to channel demand towards their products. Thus, the larger the
market, the higher are sunk costs. As a result, it is not possible to support more firms, the larger the
market is.
12 In the case of some forms of advertising there are additional problems. In particular, it is not clear
how one should evaluate the effects of non-informative image building advertising on consumer
welfare.
13 See Davies and Lyons (1996, ch. 4).16
any discussion of the anti-competitive effects of merger must be confined to price
competition and leave out R&D competition).
2.2.2 Definition of Scale Economies
14
A single-product technology is characterised by increasing returns to scale if unit cost
is lower the larger is production. There are constant returns to scale if unit cost is
unaffected by volume, and there are decreasing returns if unit cost is increased as
production is increased.
This section presents the more rigorous definitions of the notion of economies of scale
that are used in the economic literature. Rigour and formalism is necessary because
the simple and intuitive idea of scale economies turns out to be rather complex in the
context of multi-product firms. The more precise definition of returns to scale is also a
necessary basis for discussing the relationship between returns to scale and mergers in
section 2.2.3, and a necessary basis for the empirical studies reviewed in section 2.3.
To arrive at a useful definition of scale economies, that includes the various possible
sources of scale economies discussed in section 2.2.1, it is convenient to start from the
concept of the production technology, which is central to the economic theory of the
firm. The production technology may be represented either by its production function
or by its cost function (cf. duality theory). The production function describes which
input-output combinations are technically feasible to the firm. The cost function
describes the minimum cost for producing any possible output level (given the
technology and factor prices).
15 There are several reasons for focusing on the cost
function rather than the production function in defining economies of scale. The first
reason is that it is the shape of the cost function that plays a key role in determining
firm and industry structure. Second, in exploring the potential sources of increasing
returns (section 2.2.1) it was recognised that the lower unit cost achieved at larger size
is associated with organising production in a way that is different from how
production can be organised in small plants or firms. An inevitable aspect of scale
economies it therefore that factor proportions in large plants must be different from
factor proportions in small plants. For example, increased mechanisation implies a
higher capital/labour ratio. However, as will be discussed below, the definitions of
scale economies based on the production function require factor proportions to be held
constant. Such a restriction would eliminate much of the economies of large scale.
16 A
third reason for focusing on the cost function is also motivated by empirical
considerations.
17
                                                          
14 This section is based on Panzar (1989).
15 In the theoretical literature it is often emphasised that the production and cost functions represent a
given state of technological knowledge. However, at least the first firm to organise production at some
scale will necessarily have to adapt the technology to that scale. It may be difficult both theoretically
and empirically to discriminate between innovations that lower the cost function from the adaptations
necessary to achieve the lower unit cost at a higher scale. For a more detailed discussion of these
problems, see Gold (1981).
16 For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Gold (1981).
17 Estimating a production function ignores the endogeneity of the input factors. A cost function gives a
theory on how these input factors are determined, with the resulting "elegant instruments", being the




)# !-%    In order to define scale economies precisely we need to
introduce some formal notation. Consider a firm producing a single output. The
quantity of this output is denoted ,. The firm uses  different inputs, for example
different types of labour and different types of machinery. The quantity used of input 
is denoted  L / , and the complete consumption of resources is described by the vector
of inputs  () Q / / / ,..., 1 = . The technology is described by the so-called production
function. We write
() / ; , = .
The production function should be interpreted as saying: if the firm uses input vector
/, then it can produce at most ;</). Likewise, if the firm wants to produce ,, then it
needs to consume an input vector / such that ,=;</>.
0(
!$-
)# !-%    If a firm wants to produce quantity ,, there are two conditions
that must be fulfilled in order for the firm to be cost-efficient. First, it should not use
more inputs than is necessary to produce ,. This amount of necessary inputs is given
by the production function. Second, the firm should use different inputs in a
proportion that balances their relative contribution to production to their relative
prices. Let  L '  denote the price of input  L / , and  () Q ' ' ' ,..., 1 =  the vector of all 
input prices. The cost-efficient quantity of input  depends on how much the firm is
producing (that is ,) and on the prevailing factor prices (that is '). Normally, the
higher , is, or the lower the price  L '  is, the more the firm will use of the input  L / .
We write  () ' , ? L ,  to indicate the cost-efficient quantity of input  and that it depends
on quantity and factor prices. Similarly ?<,0'> denotes the whole vector of cost-
efficient inputs. The total cost of a cost-efficient firm is given by the sum of






L L ' , ? ' ' ,  
1
, , .
where  is the production cost, and  is the cost function.
! '%($
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$!*"(   In order to define scale economies, we first need to define two
more basic notions, namely average cost and marginal cost. Average cost (or unit




,  = .
Marginal cost, which we denote by <,>, is the cost of the last unit. More formally,




,  = .
The definition of scale economies that we use in this report is based on the cost
function. The intuitive idea that we want to capture is that there is increasing returns
to scale if unit cost falls when output is increased. Similarly, there are decreasing
returns to scale if unit cost is increasing when output is increased, and there are18
constant returns to scale if a change in output does not affect unit cost. Thus,
economies of scale are determined by how unit cost is affected by a change in






and that there are decreasing returns to scale if the inequality is reversed. Note that
this requirement is equivalent to marginal cost being lower than average cost, i.e.
() (),  ,  < .
The reason is simple. If the cost of producing an additional unit is lower than the
average cost of previous units, then producing the additional unit lowers average
cost.
18 If the first unit produced costs EUR 10 and the marginal cost of producing the
a second unit is EUR 5, then average cost is reduced from EUR 10 to EUR 7.5 if
production is increased from one to two units. Actually, the 			 of scale economies
is defined as the ratio between average and marginal costs, i.e.:
() ()






Returns to scale are said to be increasing, constant or decreasing as  is greater than,
equal or less than one. Note that  depends on quantity (and input prices). In
particular, it is common that average cost is falling at low output levels, then constant,
and finally increasing at high output levels. In that case,  would be larger than one at




 To complicate matters, there is a second definition of scale
economies that is often used in the literature. This definition is based on the
production function. Given a proportional increase in all input levels, does output
increase more or less than proportionally? If output increases more (less), there are
increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. For example, if output more than doubles















If <,0/>@ production increases more than input, and there are increasing returns to
scale. To complicate matters even further, the production function based measure
<,0/> need not coincide with the cost function based measure <,0'>. The reason is
that it may not be cost efficient to increase all inputs by the same proportion to
achieve the increase in production. Thus, even if per unit cost does not fall when
output is increased by expanding all inputs proportionally, it may decrease when
inputs are chosen in a cost-minimising manner. For example, it may be that doubling
both capital and labour only leads to a doubling of output (i.e. constant returns to
                                                          























scale, as defined from the production function). However, it may be that the larger
output level can also be produced using a more capital intensive technique. If the more
capital intensive technique is less costly, cost is not doubled as output is doubled (i.e.




$!*"(.   We will sometimes assume that average cost is first
decreasing and then increasing as the volume increases so that the average cost curve
is  “U-shaped.” This corresponds to assuming that for low output levels there are
increasing returns to scale and for large output levels there are decreasing returns to
scale. Other times we will assume that the average cost curve is “L-shaped,” so that
there are only increasing and then constant returns to scale. The lowest quantity where
average cost is minimised is called the minimum efficient scale (MES). The MES is
an important determinant for industry and firm structure.
A potentially complicating factor is that the measurement of scale economies depends
on input prices. Hence, even if the technological knowledge is the same in two
countries, returns to scale and the minimum efficient scale may well differ between
the two countries, if input prices differ. As a consequence, one can not take empirical
estimates of MES from one country as a standard in another country without
investigating the importance of factor price differentials.
2.2.2.2 Multiple-Product Firms
Most firms of reasonable size produce more than one product, and mergers normally
create a firm that produces an even wider range of products. For this reason it is
essential to define what is meant by economies of scale also for multiple-product
firms. Unfortunately, however, the simplicity of the definition from the single firm
case is lost. The reason is that in the multiple-product context, a firm’s cost is not only
determined by the scale of each single output, but also by the composition (or mix) of
output. The concept of scale economies can be generalised to a multiple-product
setting by considering two related measures, namely product-specific economies of
scale and so-called ray economies of scale. However, to fully capture the effect of
changes in the composition of output on cost, we also need to introduce the concepts
of economies of scope and of so-called transray convexity.
To keep the formalism at a minimum we consider the case of a two-product
technology. Let  1 ,  denote the quantity produced of good one and  2 ,  the quantity
produced of the second good. The cost of producing the two products is given by
() 2 1,, ,   for any output combination  () 2 1,, , , = . Naturally, the cost also depends on
factor prices ', but for simplicity we do not indicate this dependence explicitly. The
cost of producing an additional unit of output (i.e. marginal cost) is denoted by
() 2 1 1 ,, ,   and  () 2 1 2 ,, ,   for products one and two respectively. It is customary
to define the degree of scale economies as:
() ()
() () 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
2 1
2 1 , ,
,
,





                                                          
19 If one assumes that all inputs are chosen in a cost-minimising manner, that is
according to /=?<,0'> then the two measures coinside, that is
E(q, X(q,w)) = S(q,w).20
This definition is a natural extension of the definition in the single product case.
20 In
the case of multi-product firms, however, the notion of scale economies is more
complex than in the single-product case. In particular, overall scale economies
() ' ,  ,  is constituted by three different parts, namely the product specific economies
of scale for products one and two respectively, and the economies of scope. We will
discuss product specific scale economies and economies of scope in turn.
Although the discussion in this report is confined to the case of two products, all
definitions and results are valid also for the general case of  types of output. The
discussion here is completely focused on the cost function. However, it is possible to





!*"(.   The incremental cost of a single product, say
1 , , is defined as the extra cost of producing  1 ,  given that  2 ,  is already produced, i.e.
as  () () ( ) 2 2 1 2 1 1 , 0 , , ,  , ,  , ,  − = . The average incremental cost of product one is
defined as  () ()1 2 1 1 2 1 1 , , , , ,  , ,  = . The degree of scale economies specific to
product one is defined as
() ()
() 2 1 1
2 1 1





, ,  = .
Product specific returns to scale are said to be increasing (decreasing) if  1   is larger
(smaller) than one.
There exists a relationship between the overall degree of scale economies  and the
degree of product specific scale economies  L  . This relation can be described by the
following equation:
() () () []
*
, ,  
 , ,  

, , 




































Hence, the numerator in equation (1) is the weighted average of the product specific
returns to scale. Thus, the more product specific economies of scope there are (large
1   and  2  ), the more overall scale economies there are (large S). The denominator is
related to the so-called economies of scope.
! '%($
)
!+(.    In addition to the more familiar cost savings deriving from the
scale of operations, cost savings may also result from the production of several
                                                          













, = = .21
different outputs in one firm rather than each being produced in its own specialised
firm. A striking example of scope economies is that it is cheaper to produce different
forms of oil derivatives in one firm than in several specialised firms. We say that there
exists economies of scope if the cost of producing  1 ,  and  2 ,  is smaller in the case
production of both goods is carried out in a single firm, rather than in two separate
firms.
21 Formally, there are economies of scope if
() ( ) ( ) 2 1 2 1 , 0 0 , , ,  ,  , ,  + < .
The 			 of economies of scope measures the percentage increase in cost that would
result from dividing the production of  1 ,  and  2 ,  into two separate firms, rather than
producing both goods in a single firm. Thus, the degree of economies of scope is
defined as
() ()( )( )
() 2 1
2 1 2 1
2 1 ,
, , 0 0 ,
,
, , 




For example, if the cost of production is fifty per cent larger in case the two products
are produced separately, then SC = 0.5 (that is 50 per cent). If there are economies of
scope, then @. If there are diseconomies of scope, then  0 <  . One can show
that since all products have positive incremental cost, then  () 1 , 2 1 < , ,  .
22
Using the definition of scope economies, overall scale economies (that is, equation
(1)) can be written as
() () ()
() 2 1
2 1 2 2 2 1 1 1
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= .( 1 ’).
Equation (1’) shows that the overall scale economies are determined by three factors.
The product specific scale economies of products one and two, and the economies of
scope. If the product specific economies of scale are strong, also overall scale
economies tend to, but need not, be strong. Actually, even if there are product specific
economies of scale, there may be overall diseconomies of scale. The reason is that
there may be diseconomies of scope, and that the diseconomies of scope may
dominate the product specific economies of scale. For example, if
() ()2 , , 2 1 2 2 1 1 = = , ,  , ,  , there are overall diseconomies of scale if
()1 , 2 1 − < , ,  .
23
Another concept to describe how cost depends on the composition of output is
transray convexity. Roughly speaking, the cost function is transray convex if as a firm
changes the composition of output while holding fixed the level of some aggregate
                                                          
22 To see this, first note that note that
() () () () [] () 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 , , , , , , ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  , ,  − − = . Using the definition of
incremental cost, the degree of scale economies can be written
() () ()
() 2 1









Since the last term is positive when incremental costs are positive, it follows that  () 1 , 2 1 < , ,  .
23 One may derive conditions (weak cost complementarities) in terms of the properties of the multi-
product cost function that can be used for empirically inferring the presence of economies of scope.22
measure of output, costs will be lower for diverse rather than specialised output
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!*"(    In the multi-product case, also the idea of minimum
efficient scale (MES) becomes more complex. To discuss MES, one defines the so-
called ray-average cost, by
() ()










The weights  1 *  and  2 *  are two completely arbitrary numbers. Their only role is to
combine the two quantities into a single measure of size.
Although this construct is artificial, it surprisingly makes it possible to formally relate
the slope of the 7 curve to the degree of scale economies. In particular, one may
consider how 7 is affected by increased production, assuming that the production
of the two products is increased by the same proportion (e.g. ten per cent). One may
show that, if ray-average cost is reduced (increased) as production is increased in a
proportional way, there are increasing (decreasing) returns to scale.
Using the notion of ray-average cost, one may talk about “U-shaped” average cost also
in the case of multiple products. The ray-average cost is U-shaped if ray-average cost
is first decreasing, then constant, and eventually increasing. The only complication in
the multiple-product case is that the size of the output bundle at which scale
economies are exhausted will tend to vary with the composition of the bundle. For
example, it may be that the MES is small if the firm is producing relatively much of
product one in comparison to product two, while MES is large if the firm is producing
relatively much of product two. Thus, instead of a single point of minimum efficient
scale, there will be “locus” of such points.
2.2.2.3 Multiple-Plant Firms
In the discussion above we did not distinguish between the production technology of a
firm and the production technology of a single plant. However, since firms can and
often do run more than one plant, the distinction is important.
Some scale economies can be achieved already in a single plant. Examples may be
some economies related to specialisation and mechanisation. When the scale
economies at the plant level are exhausted, for example due to worker alienation, it is
better to divide production between two plants than to produce all output in a single
plant. Another reason for dividing production between two plants is that having two
plants located in different geographical markets can lower transportation costs. The
fact that plant economies are exhausted does not imply, however, that firm size is
optimal. The reason is that there may exist economies of scale associated with running
more than one plant in each firm. For example purchasing of inputs may be better
organised by one centralised department than to have one small department in each
plant. However, also multi-plant economies are often exhausted above some level.
The cost per unit will rise when the firm operates so many plants that corporate
management starts to lose track of local operations.23
The relation between the plant level cost function and the firm level cost function can
be described in the following way. Assume that a firm has only one plant, and denote
the cost function for this firm by  () 1 , ,   where 1 indicates that the firm has only one
plant. This cost function (which may also be called plant level cost function) indicates
the lowest cost of producing , units of output in a single plant. Similarly  () 2 , , 
indicates the lowest cost of producing , units in a two-plant firm. This cost function
presupposes that the production is allocated in a cost-minimising way between the two
plants. It also presumes that the firm has chosen to organise the purchasing function
(joint or separate) in the most cost efficient way. The cost function at the firm level is
given by
() ( ) ( ) ( ) {} ,... , ,..., 2 , , 1 , min  ,  ,  ,  ,  Q
)LUP =
Thus, the firm level cost function is built on the assumption that the firm, for any
output level ,, will chose the number of plants that produces , at the lowest possible
cost.
The discussion in the previous sections defines what we mean by economies of scale
for a given cost function. Actually, that discussion is general enough to be interpreted
both in terms of the technology of a single plant and in terms of the technology of a
firm. In the first case the cost function <,> in the above section should be understood
as <,0> and in the second case it should be understood as () , 
)LUP . Thus, there is no
reason to have a separate discussion of measures of scale economies at the firm level.
In some empirical studies of economies of scale associated with  () , 
)LUP  it is found
that there is one region of low output in which unit cost is falling, and that there is one
region of high output where unit cost is increasing. There is also a substantial range of
intermediary output levels where unit cost is at the minimum. The reason for this
shape may be multi-plant operations. The scale economies at low output levels may
have to do with scale economies at the plant level. Then there is the intermediate
region where the firm operates a number of firms at minimum cost. Finally there is a
region where multi-plant diseconomies are important.
In the context of mergers one should distinguish between plant level scale economies
and firm level economies. Most economies of scale at the plant level can only be
exploited in the long run, when the use of capital can be adjusted. In contrast,
important multi-plant economies of scale may be exploited even in the short-run.
First, the elimination of administrative duplication may not require long lags. Second,
there are also often product-specific economies of multiplant operation. If a firm
produces different products in a single plant production time will inevitably be lost as
assembly lines are switched from one product to another. By operating more than one
plant, a firm can specialise the production of high-volume products in single plants.
This will reduce down time due to shifting production, resulting in run-length
economies. Run-length economies are important in many industries, including fabric
weaving and finishing, shoe making, bottle blowing, and bearing manufacturing.
24
However, it is also important to point out that such short-run gains related to
economies of multiplant operation can be expected to be insufficient for a merger to
reduce price. The elimination of duplicated administrative functions affects fixed
                                                          
24 Scherer et al (1975, p 51).24
rather than variable costs. The specialisation of production in different plants is an
instance of so-called rationalisation, which is insufficient to reduce price.
25
2.2.3 Scale Economies and Mergers
In this section we discuss the relationship between, on the one hand scale economies,
and on the other hand the effect of merger on cost. If production is characterised by
scale economies, under what conditions can they be exploited by means of merger? In
part, this question was analysed by Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
26 However, a
limitation in their analysis is that they focus on the case when the capital stock in each
plant is fixed—the short run. Drawing on the theory of sub-additivity, we analyse the
effect of mergers on cost in the long run—when firms can adjust their capital stock
freely.
Farrell’s and Shapiro’s short-run analysis and the long-run analysis undertaken in this
report are complements. The first analysis considers the extreme case when the capital
stock in every plant is fixed. The second analysis considers the other extreme case
when firms freely can adjust their capital. In the long run, cost savings are larger than
in the short run. Hence, the latter form of analysis is more likely to produce a positive
picture of the effects of the merger. As a consequence, antitrust authorities may reach
different decisions regarding a merger, depending on whether they consider the long
run or the short run effects. To complicate the picture further, it is likely that capital
adjustments require different amounts of time in different industries. If the antitrust
authority must evaluate the effects of the merger within the first two-year period,
long-run analysis may be relevant for some industries and short-run analysis may be
relevant for other industries.
A strength with the analysis is that we are able to analyse not only the effect of merger
on cost. Using the concept of sub-additivity, we are also able to say if a full merger is
the best way to restructure production in order to produce the given output as cheaply
as possible (section 2.2.3.3). This is important since there are often several
alternatives, short of a full merger, that may reduce cost without imposing all the anti-
competitive effects of a horizontal merger. Antitrust authorities are often required to
make such a broad evaluation of mergers. The reason is the requirement that cost
savings should be merger specific.
We should also mention that all cost comparisons are made at a given quantity of
output. In reality, a merger will affect output for several reasons. The reduction of
competition will tend to reduce output. The reduction of cost, on the other hand, will
tend to increase production. The net effect may be negative or positive depending on
the circumstances. It is customary, however, to decompose the change in cost into two
parts. The first part is the change in cost due to increased efficiency. This effect is
must be measured at some given level production. Following Williamson (1968) the
normal procedure is to measure this effect at the level of production chosen by the
merged entity. The second part is the change in cost due to the change in quantity.
(The second part is normally subtracted from the change in consumers’ surplus to
generate a measure of the change in dead weight loss resulting from the merger.)
                                                          
25 Farrell and Shapiro (1990).
26 Their analysis is described in Röller, Stennek and Verboven (1999).25
However, there are also some limitations in this analysis. Any adjustment costs
associated with merger are not included in the analysis.
2.2.3.1 Single-Product Firms
In the single product case, economies of scale (in the relevant range) implies that a
merger reduces cost. To see this, consider an industry where there are economies of






<    for all A.
That is, the unit cost of producing , is lower than the unit cost of producing only ,A
,. Consider a merger between two firms, one producing , and the other producing <(
>,. Thus, they together produce , units. Before the merger the total cost of production
is <,>B<<(>,> and after the merger the total cost of production is <,>. In this
case, a merger reduces cost, that is
27
<,>A<,>B<<(>,>
The reason is simple. Since the unit cost of production is lower at , than at any level
below ,, it must be less costly to produce    q t)q - (1 tq = +  units in one firm than in
two separate firms. Thus, in the single product case there exists a simple and





Economies of scale (in the relevant range) are sufficient for
a merger to reduce cost in the long run, in the single product case.
However, we should emphasise that this analysis suffers from several limitations.
First, the analysis does not have anything to say about what happens to cost in the
short run, before the input of capital can be changed. Second, the analysis abstracts
from any adjustment costs.
The qualifier  			)

	 is important. In many industries the technology is
characterised by increasing returns to scale at low production levels, then a segment of
approximately constant returns to scale, and eventually, there are diseconomies of
scale. In short, the unit cost function is U-shaped. In order for a merger to reduce cost,
it is only important that there are scale economies up to the level of production that
firms will carry out. Above that level, possible diseconomies of scale will not affect
the merger.
Although scale economies are sufficient for a merger to lower cost, it is important to
note that scale economies are not necessary for a merger to reduce cost. Here, we will
consider two reasons for this to be so. If the two firms have access to 		
                                                          
27 To see this rewrite the inequality as
() () [] () () ()
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It is easy to see that economies of scale implies that this inequality is fulfilled, since both []-parenthesis
are positive.26
	 	
 (i.e. different knowledge) a merger may reduce cost also in the absence
of economies of scale. It may be that both firms have constant returns to scale but that
one firm has a superior technology with a lower marginal cost. Then, transferring
knowledge to the other plant, or transferring production to the superior plant, lowers
cost. It may also be that the two firms have different, but complementary, patents so
that a merger expands the production technology to both plants.
A more surprising result is that even if the two firms have access to the 

	
	 , a merger may reduce cost in the presence of diseconomies of scale.
Assume that the firms have the cost function <,>=
B, for A,A and <,>=

B*B, for A,, where 
@*@. That is, there is a fixed cost (
) associated with
production up to y, and then there is an additional fixed cost (*A
) associated with
production beyond that level. For example, consider a shipping market. In order to
ship the quantity  A , A  it is necessary to build a firm including various
administrative functions and to invest in one ship (i.e. the fixed cost 
 is equal to the
cost of administration plus the cost of one ship). In order to ship the quantity A,A
 it is necessary to invest in a second ship (i.e. the fixed cost * is equal to the cost of
one ship). However, the administration may not need to be duplicated. Then, average
cost is increasing as production is expanded from a level slightly lower than  to a
level slightly higher than  (a second ship must be bought). Nevertheless, it is cheaper
to produce in one firm, than to keep two independent firms since *A
 (running only
one firm avoids the duplication of administrative costs). Thus:
2$(,3*-% 
&   Economies of scale are not necessary for a merger to
reduce cost, even if the firms have access to the same technology.
To sum up the case of single output technologies: economies of scale are sufficient,
but not necessary, for a horizontal merger to reduce cost in the long run.
2.2.3.2 Multi-Product Firms
In the multi product case, economies of scale are not sufficient for a merger to reduce
cost. One reason for this is that there may be overall scale economies at the same time
as there are diseconomies of scope. In that case, a merger between two formerly
separate product lines may increase costs. This fact is demonstrated in a theoretical
example (Example 1 in Appendix 2.2.3.4). Thus, despite possible econometric
evidence showing the existence of scale economies, a merger would nevertheless
increase cost.
More surprising is that economies of scale and economies of scope together do not
suffice to guarantee that a merger will reduce cost. This fact is demonstrated in a
theoretical example (Example 2 in Appendix 2.2.3.4). The gist of the example is the
following. Consider a farmer producing proteins and textile fibres. The farmer can use
three processes. The farmer can raise sheep, producing both proteins and fibres
(Marshallian joint production). Alternatively, the farmer can grow beans to produce
proteins or flax to produce textile fibres. However, since the cheep will destroy the
crop, the farmer must fence in the smaller of these operations which is costly. The
presence of a (small) fixed cost entails economies of scale. The economies of scope
comes from the Marshallian joint production in raising sheep. It is more expensive to
produce one unit of fibre and one unit of protein by growing flax and beans. At the
same time there is an element of diseconomies of scope due to the negative externality27
between raising sheep and growing crop. However, in the example the first effect
dominates the latter. To minimise production cost in this case there should be one firm
raising sheep to produce proteins and fibres. Then there should be one firm growing
either beans or flax depending on whether there is need to produce additional protein
or additional fibres. In this way Marshallian joint production is exploited and fencing
is avoided. Thus:
2$(,3*-% 
 &   Economies of scale and economies of scope (in the
relevant range), together, do not suffice to guarantee that a merger will reduce
cost.
Thus, in the multi-product case, there is no logical connection between economies of
scale and cost savings from mergers:
2$(,3*-% 
&   Economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient for
a merger to reduce cost, in the case of multi-product firms.
In view of this result, it is clear that a stronger set of sufficient conditions is required
to guarantee that mergers reduce costs. Actually, when pushing this analysis further, it
is reasonable to generalize the discussion, and to replace the concept of scale
economies with the concept of subadditivity. This discussion is found in the next
Section 2.2.3.3.
2.2.3.3 Merger Specificity
The above discussion was exclusively focusing on the question if a merger reduces
cost. From a policy point of view, however, that is not the relevant question. The
reason is that in most countries with an efficiency defence, there is a so-called merger
specificity clause. According to this requirement, cost reductions can not save a
horizontal merger unless the merger is the least anti-competitive means of achieving
the cost savings. Thus, if there exists some alternative restructuring of production,
short of a full merger, that achieves the same cost cuts (or more), the merger should
not be allowed. In Example 3 below we show that it may well be that a merger
reduces cost as compared to the initial production structure, but that there may exist
another restructuring that lower cost even more. In the example there are two product
varieties and two firms that both produce both varieties. A merger would reduce cost
due to product specific economies of scale. However, due to diseconomies of scope,
cost would be reduced even further if the two firms specialise in one of the varieties
each. This alternative restructuring may also be preferred from a competition point of
view, if consumers consider the two varieties as substitutable.
In order to accommodate this complication, the rest of the discussion is not focusing
on the question if a merger reduces cost. Rather, we ask the question if a merger

	
 the cost of producing a given output (equal to the aggregate output of the
two firms before the merger). The central concept in this discussion is so-called strict
subadditivity. To define this concept, consider the case of two products. Assume that
we want to produce the quantity  1 ,  of product one and  2 ,  of product two. We may
divide production in any way we want into 1 separate firms. Let 
2
1 ,  denote the
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2 ... , , , ,
N = + + + .28
A cost function  () 2 1,, ,   is said to be 
 
*
)	 in the production of
() 2 1,, ,  if








1 , , ... , , , ,  , ,  , ,  , , 
N N > + + + ,
independent of how production is divided between the 1 firms, and independent of
how many separate firm (i.e. 1) there are.
2$(,3*-% 
& If the cost function is subadditive (in the relevant range), a
merger reduces cost. Moreover, there does not exist any less concentrated
alternative to the merger that reduces cost even more.
Hence, if the merging firms can show that their cost function is subadditive, they have
established that, from the point of view of productive efficiency, a full merger is the
best way of organising the production of () 2 1,, , . Expressed in a different way,
subadditivity but not scale economies is the relevant concept to use in judging if a full
merger is the best way of achieving cost efficiency. Naturally, productive efficiency
must still be traded off against possible anti-competitive effects.
Still, however, subadditivity and scale economies are related, and the economic
literature contains several sets of sufficient conditions (for example in terms of scale
economies) for the cost function to be subadditive. These conditions may be of
practical use to merger control, even though the sufficient conditions are more
restrictive than subadditivity itself. The reason is that it may often be easier to find
econometric evidence on for example scale economies than econometric evidence on
subadditivity. The first condition is also intuitively appealing.
2$(,3*-% 
&   If (i) there are product specific economies of scale for all
products, and (ii) there are (weak) economies of scope, then the cost function
is subadditive.
28
Actually one can show that if there are product specific economies of scale for a
particular product, then industry cost minimisation requires that production of this
good is consolidated in a single firm. Economies of scope implies that all production
lines should be allocated within a single firm.
Additional sets of sufficient conditions for subadditivity, for example in terms of
transray convexity, can be found in the literature.
29
2.2.3.4 Appendix: Theoretical Examples
The following examples are chosen because of their simplicity. They are not intended
to portray real world merger decisions.
4*'+"(

The simplest possible example to illustrate that economies of scale are not sufficient
for a merger to reduce cost is the following. Assume that firms’ costs are given by
                                                          
28 This condition was established by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982).
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In this case, there are overall economies of scale since
()() ( ) 2 1 2 1 1 , , ,    , ,  + + + =  is larger than one. There are also product specific
economies of scale since  () 1 2 1 1 1 , ,  , ,  + =  is larger than one (and similarly for
product two). However, there are diseconomies of scope if    >  since then
() () ( ) [] 0 , 2 1 2 1 < + + + − = , ,      , ,  . In this case, a merger increases cost if
the two firms before the merger produced one of the two products each. In particular,
() ( ) ( ) ( ) [] [ ] [ ] 0 , 0 0 , , 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 > − = + − + − + + + = − −   ,  ,  , ,    ,  ,  , ,  .
Thus, despite possible econometric evidence showing the existence of scale
economies, a merger would nevertheless increase cost.
4*'+"(
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To demonstrate the second point (that economies of scale and economies of scope
together do not suffice to guarantee that a merger will reduce cost) consider the
following example. Raising sheep costs EUR 10 per animal and yields one unit of
protein and one unit of fibre. Growing beans or flax costs EUR 6 per unit of protein or
fibre obtained. Fencing costs EUR 1 per unit of the smallest activity. The setup cost, 	,
is small. To minimise the cost of producing proteins, , and fibres, , the farmer
should raise sheep, 
. In particular he should raise  {}   
 , min =  sheep. The farmer
must also grow crop, either flax or beans. In particular he must grow the quantity
{} {}      , min , max − = . Thus, the cost function is
() { } 	  
  
    + + + = , min 6 10 , ,
where the third term is the fencing cost. Due to the fixed cost, 	, the cost function
exhibits increasing returns to scale everywhere. If the same amount of fibres and
proteins are produced in separate firms, the cost is is
()()( ) {} {} () 	     	       2 , min , max 6 2 6 , 0 0 , + + = + + = + .
The cost function exhibits economies of scope everywhere since
()()( ) = − +        , , 0 0 ,
{} {} {} {} {} { } 0 , min , min , max , , min min , min 2 ≥ + ≥ + − − = 	   	        
Assume now that the market demands more protein than fibres, so that @. Consider
dividing production of ()  ,  between two firms with output levels ()   ,  and
() 0 ,   − . This division results in total costs of
() ( ) [] () [] 	   	        + − + + = − + 6 10 0 , , .
This division of production into two firms lowers cost since
()( ) () = − − +          , 0 , ,30
[] (){ } [] 0 , min 6 10 2 6 4 < + − + − + − + + = 	       	   ,
when 	 is small. (Remember that the fixed cost is small.) A merger between the two
firms would increase cost due to the need for fencing.
4*'+"(
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Consider again the cost function in Example 1 in Section 2.2.3.2. Assume that in the
outset, both firms produce both products. Let 
2
1 ,  denote firm two’s production of
good one, and so on. The firms propose a merger. Such a merger will reduce cost:
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1 , ,    , ,    , , , ,   
() 0 < + − =   .
However, if the two firms instead of a merger agree to specialise in one of the
products each, then the costs of production would be reduced even further (this
follows immediately from Example 1).
2.2.4 Summary and Conclusions
We begin our analysis with an intuitive discussion of the sources of scale economies.
A production process is said to have scale economies if the unit cost of production is
lower when more is produced. There are several sources of scale economies, such as
mechanisation and specialisation achieved through division of labour. Without
constructing a full typology, we compile a “checklist” of the most common sources of
scale economies.
We also draw a sharp distinction between technologically determined economies of
scale and overheads such as advertising and R&D. Due to state of economic
knowledge, we are forced to primarily focus this overview on the first type of scale
economies. However, we also argue that this state of knowledge is very unsatisfactory.
Advertising and R&D are important features of most concentrated European
industries.
Next, we define the term scale economies more rigorously. This section is an
important input for discussing the relationship between mergers and production costs,
and also for presenting the empirical literature. In the economic literature there exists
two different definitions of scale economies, one based on the so-called production
function, the other based on the so-called cost function. We argue that for the purpose
of analysing efficiency gains from mergers, it is vital to use the concept based on the
cost function. The reason is that the exploitation of some scale economies (e.g.
mechanisation) requires changing the factor proportions. Such gains are only captured
by the concept based on the cost function. The primary complication in defining scale
economies arises when firms produce more than one product. In this case, there may
exist overall diseconomies of scale even if there are (product specific) economies of
scale for all individual products. The reason is that there may exist so-called
diseconomies of scope. Another complication is that the minimum efficient scale of a
firm depends on the mix in witch the firm produces the different products.31
We then discuss the theoretical relation between mergers and scale economies. That
is, if production is characterised by scale economies, under what conditions can they
be exploited by means of merger? In part, this question was analysed by Farrell and
Shapiro (1990).
30 However, a limitation in their analysis is that they focus on the case
when the capital stock in each plant is fixed—the short run. Drawing on the theory of
sub-additivity, we analyse the effect of mergers on cost in the long run—when firms
can adjust their capital stock freely.
In the single product case, the relation is rather straightforward. Economies of scale
(in the relevant range) are sufficient, but not necessary, for a merger to reduce cost.
31
In the multiple-product case, the primary finding is that that the relation between scale
economies and mergers is rather complex. Even if there are unexploited scale
economies, mergers may well raise rather than reduce cost. A positive finding is that
one can establish different sets of sufficient conditions for mergers to reduce cost.
These conditions are based on the notion of sub-additivitity of the cost function. For
example, if there are product specific economies of scale for all products, and there
are economies of scope, then a merger reduces cost. In effect, these theoretical results
show that in evaluating the effect of a merger on cost, competition authorities need to
take into account both product specific economies of scale and potential economies of
scope. However, in order to make these conditions more precise additional analysis,
similar to that undertaken by Farrell and Shapiro for the short-run case, is needed.
A strength with the analysis is that we are able to analyse not only the effect of merger
on cost. Using the concept of sub-additivity, we are also able to say if a full merger is
the best way to restructure production in order to produce the given output as cheaply
as possible. This is important since there are often several alternatives, short of a full
merger, that may reduce cost without imposing all the anti-competitive effects of a
horizontal merger. Antitrust authorities are often required to make such a broad
evaluation of mergers. The reason is the requirement that cost savings should be
merger specific.
Farrell’s and Shapiro’s short-run analysis and the long-run analysis undertaken in this
report are complements. The first analysis considers the extreme case when the capital
stock in every plant is fixed. The second analysis considers the other extreme case
when firms freely can adjust their capital. In the long run, cost savings are larger than
in the short run. Hence, the latter form of analysis is more likely to produce a positive
picture of the effects of the merger. As a consequence, antitrust authorities may reach
different decisions regarding a merger, depending on whether they consider the long
run or the short run effects. To complicate the picture further, it is likely that capital
adjustments require different amounts of time in different industries. Therefore, if the
antitrust authority evaluates the effects of the merger within the first two-year period,
                                                          
30 Their analysis is described in Röller, Stennek and Verboven (1999).
31 If the two firms have access to 			 	
 (i.e. different knowledge) a merger may reduce
cost also in the absence of economies of scale. It may be that both firms have constant returns to scale
but that one firm has a superior technology with a lower marginal cost. Then, transferring knowledge to
the other plant, or transferring production to the superior plant, lowers cost. It may also be that the two
firms have different, but complementary, patents so that a merger expands the production technology to
both plants.32
long-run analysis may be relevant for some industries and short-run analysis may be
relevant for other industries.
32
In sum:












































The question that we are interested in answering is to what extent production costs can
be reduced as a result of horizontal mergers. Unfortunately, however, there is very
little direct empirical evidence on the effect of merger on cost. The purpose of this
section is to review the empirical studies of scale economies in various industries, and
to investigate if such evidence can be used to indirectly shed light on the likely
efficiency gains from mergers.
There are several approaches for measuring cost-scale relationships. One approach has
been to analyse profitability as a function of firm size. The attractiveness of this
approach is that data on profits at the firm level are relatively easy to collect.
However, we will not focus on this approach since profits are affected by so many
other circumstances than just scale economies. In particular, since profits are sensitive
to market power, and since firm size may well be related to market power, this
approach does not seem well suited in the present context an efficiency defence in
merger control, which is all about the relative strength of market power and cost
efficiency. A second approach is the so-called survivor test.
33 Firm or plant sizes that
survive and gain larger market shares over time are assumed to be efficient, and those
that lose market shares over time are considered to be too large or too small. Again,
one may suspect that selection operates on profitability (or possibly relative
profitability) and hence that it is difficult to separate scale economies from market
power using this approach.
In this review we focus on direct estimates of the cost-scale relationship. There are
three approaches within this class, namely econometric cost function (or production





34 who covered twenty different industries undertook the
pioneering study. This approach is built on interviews (or questioners) with engineers
whose profession it is to plan and design new production units and plants.
	 

 . Economists have used econometric techniques to estimate
cost or production functions. The estimated functions may be investigated concerning
their scale economy properties. In this category we include traditional least squares
econometric production models and stochastic frontiers methods.
                                                          
32 Unfortunately, the empirical literature does not report any measures of how long time that is required
in order to achieve scale economies in different industries. Another important issue that is unexplored in
the literature is the possible differences in time required for achieving scale economies by means of
merger and by means of internal growth.
33 See Stigler (1958).







  This approach is similar to the econometric
approach in that the aim is to estimate a frontier cost or production function, using
input and output data collected from different firms. However, the so-called data
envelopment analysis (DEA) builds on mathematical programming rather than
standard statistical techniques.
For a much more detailed (technical) discussion and comparison of the econometric
and mathematical programming approaches, see Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998). A
methodological discussion and an extensive survey of the engineering approach can
be found in Pratten (1988).
2.3.1 Econometric Approach: Methodology
This section will review the empirical results from cost-function based estimates of
scale economies. The discussion of the empirical results is sorted by industry. We start





 # !-% .   One issue is whether to directly estimate a
production function, or to estimate a cost function. As we have already argued in
section 2.2.2, in the present context the cost-function approach is preferred. It is the
cost function that determines industry structure. From an econometric perspective,
estimation of a cost function may be preferable since it accounts for the endogeneity




	% -*.(   To estimate a cost function one has to gather data on the cost of
production from existing plants operating at varying scales of output. Such data
usually relate to plants built at different points in time. The plant and equipment is of
varying vintages and the latest plant and equipment may incorporate knowledge which
was not available when the earlier units where built. As a result the estimates will
usually not reflect the technology of a particular point in time. Expressed in other
words, cost differences between different firms may not only reflect varying scale but





,2"('   The early empirical literature on scale
economies has been severely criticised on several accounts. According to Gold
(1981),
37 the single most important reason for the inadequacies of the early research
was the tendency to carry out the analysis at too high levels of aggregation. Often
analysis was carried out at four, three or event two digit levels of industrial
classification. At this level of aggregation firms do not produce homogenous goods,
and comparisons of costs at different “scales” may reflect differences in products
rather than economies of scale.  This aggregation prevents conformance with the
requirements not only of theory, but of practical evaluations by industrial executives
and by government officials as well.
                                                          
35 A recent discussion of the econometric issues involved in empirical analysis of production can be
found in Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998).
36 For more on these issue see Coelli, Rao and Battese (1998). They also discuss the choice of
functional forms. The first study to use the cost function, with factor prices as arguments, in the study of





 ! '%($ Researchers have lacked an interest to identify the
sources of scale economies.
38 The dominant concern has been to mechanically
describe the relation between firm or plant size and unit cost. This is unfortunate in
the present context. Scale economies may often be achieved in different ways, some
of which may be less damaging to competition than mergers. In some cases a joint
venture may achieve the gains. Thus, for antitrust authorities to evaluate different






,2"('   Since most large firms produce a
large variety of products, estimation of their cost functions involves a large number of
parameters. Due to data limitations, researchers must aggregate the output data in
some way. There are two methods that have been used to do so. The typical method in
the early literature was to construct a single scalar measure of output by only
considering firm revenues. Unfortunately, this approach implicitly imposes the
restriction that the so-called transformation rate between different products is
constant. In other words, it is assumed that the cost function can be written as




  , ,  + =  where  1 
  and  2 
  are two constants. As a result, it is
impossible to distinguish between different products’ product-specific economies of
scale. It is also impossible to distinguish between economies of scale and economies
of scope.
There is one case in which it is possible to infer properties of   from estimates of 
~
.
If all firms at all times (included in the sample) produce the same output mix, the
economies of scale calculated from 
~
 will coincide with the degree of multiple-
product economies of scale 
 	*
	)	/. However, it is in general not
valid to extrapolate this measure to other product mixes.
The more modern method is the so-called  	
 approach.
39 Assume
that we want to estimate the cost function for airlines. Every destination-origin pair is
a separate market. Thus, in an economy with 100 cities, there are 9 900 different types
of output. Thus the cost function  () 9900 1,...,, ,   is likely to contain a very large
number of parameters. However, it is likely that passenger miles and the number of
cities served by the firm determine the cost for airlines. One may then estimate a
hedonic cost function  ()    ,
~
 where  is passenger miles and  is the number of
cities served. In this case 9 900 variables have been turned into only two. After 
~
 has
been estimated one may indirectly compute measures of scale economies for .






# !-% $.   Another empirical problem is that the available
data often allows a short-run but not long-run cost function to be estimated. For
example, if a cost function is to be estimated using monthly data from a single firm, it
would be unrealistic to assume that the firms capital inputs were adjusted to the cost-
minimising level associated with each month’s output level. Unfortunately, the short-
                                                          
38 Gold (1981).
39 This approach was pioneered by Spady and Friedlaender (1978).
40 See Caves, Christensen and Tretheway (1984).35
run cost function does in general not carry the information needed to analyse
economies of scale.
41
2.3.2 Econometric Approach: Empirical Estimates
Regulated or formerly regulated industries have been much more studied than many
other industries. The primary reasons for this is that the data have been much more
available due to the regulations. In a sense this is fortunate since antitrust issues are
especially important in these industries after deregulation. Here we review the
development in the trucking and electric power industries that have generated much of
the methodological development. However, there has also been econometric studies of






In empirically analysing the costs of a multiple-product firm, the basic problem is one
of aggregation. Since most firms typically produce a wide range of diverse products, it
is generally impossible to incorporate all outputs in the analysis, because of the
limited number of observations relative to the potential number of parameters that
would have to be estimated. For example, trucking output is very heterogeneous. Not
only do trucks haul different commodities with different handling requirements, but
they also haul them in different shipment sizes, in different loads, and for different
lengths of haul. Drawing on theoretical work on production theory, Spady and
Friedlaender (1978) attempted to take the composition of output into account by
introducing the operating characteristics of the firm explicitly into the cost function.
They introduced a so-called hedonic output function that attempted to measure
effective output as a function of physical output (,) and the characteristics of that
output ( P / / ,..., 1 ) where  was measured in tonmiles and the /’s represented variables
such as shipment size, average load, average length of haul, and so on. Thus, instead
of estimating a traditional cost function as  () ' ,   , =  they estimated a cost function
as  () () ' / , C   , ,
~
=  where  () / , C ,  represents hedonically adjusted output and w
represents a vector of factor prices.
They found that the inclusion of operating characteristics made a significant
difference. When costs are estimated using physical output (,) alone, marked
economies of scale where found. However, when operating characteristics (the /’s)
were included, the measured scale economies disappeared. Since larger firms tend to
utilize longer hauls and larger shipment sizes, they tend to have lower costs. However,
if smaller firms could have the same operating characteristics as large firms, they
could presumably achieve comparable advantages. (The small firms in the sample
were kept from achieving the operating characteristics or the large firms because of
limited regulatory operating rights.)
The study by Spady and Friedlaender (1978) has two important limitations. Due to the
specification of the hedonic cost function the operating characteristics (or output
                                                          
41 See Braeutigam and Daughety (1983).
42 See Jara-Diaz and Whinston (1981), and Jara-Diaz and Cortes (1996).
43 See Friedlaender, Whinston, and Wang (1983).
44 See Fuss and Waverman (1981), and Fuss (1983) for a survey. See also Foreman et al. (1999)36
composition) is not allowed to affect the substitutability between different factors of
production. However, Friedlaender and Spady (1981) solved this problem by
specifying the cost function as  () ' / ,   , ,
~
= .
The second limitation is that the aggregate measures of output not only vary with the
scale of output but also with its composition. Thus, measures of scale economies
based on their approach are necessarily ambiguous since they may reflect the effects
of both scale and scope upon costs. Later contributions have resolved also this
problem. Thus the hedonic cost function approach can be adapted to distinguish
between different types of economies of largeness (see the study by Caves et al.,
1984).
There is also a study of the trucking industry attempting to distinguish between
economies of scale and scope. This study incorporates desegregate output, but also
variables that reflect the configuration and utilisation of the network over which the
firm operates. Wang Chiang (1981)
45 shows that firms enjoy marked economies of
networking. Networks having many connected links and networks permitting direct
routing leads to significant saving in costs. These network effects explain much of the
economies of scale and scope that Wang Chiang observed.
"(!-,%!
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Nerlove (1963) studies economies of scale in electricity generation, using data from
1955.
46 The study is based on modern duality theory. The estimated cost function
includes factor prices as arguments. The basic estimation equation was a Cobb-
Douglas log-linear specification of the cost function:
() () [] ∑ + + = L L  ,  ln 1 ln 1 ln α σ σ κ .
Here σ  is the (single product) degree of scale economies. The  L  ’s refer to the prices
of labour, fuel and capital. The sum ∑ L α  is constrained to equal unity. The main
finding is that there exists important economies of scale in electricity generation. In
particular the model yielded an estimate of  4 . 1 ≈ σ . That would mean that if the
firm’s cost would exceed its revenues by forty percent if its output were priced at
marginal cost.
The functional form used restricts the degree of economies of scale to be the same for
all output levels. To check the importance of this restriction, Nerlove divided the
sample into five output categories. Doing so revealed that the economies of scale are
exhausted at large plant sizes. In the largest group there where diseconomies of scale.
Nerlove’s study has had a methodological influential in two ways. First, it established
the cost function, with its factor price arguments, as the proper framework in which to
study economies of scale. Second, it showed that the degree of scale economies
declines with output, thereby demonstrating the need for more flexible functional
forms than the one used by Nerlove himself.
Christensen and Greene (1976) employ more flexible functional forms, allowing the
degree of scale economies to vary with the level of output. In particular, they
employed the translog cost function:
                                                          
45 This study is usefully summarized in Bailey and Friedlaender (1982).
46 This study is usefully summarized in Panzar (1989).37
[] ∑ ∑ ∑∑ + + + + + = L L M L LM L L           ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 γ β α κ .
In order for this function to represent a proper cost structure some restrictions on the
parameters of the model must be imposed. Using data from 1970, they found that the
cost function is U-shaped, with a large segment that is approximately flat.
Approximately 45 percent of the output was produced in the minimum cost segment.
A problem with the above studies is that they do not take the multiproduct nature of
the studied industry into account. Many electric utilities sell natural gas as well.
Another complication is that firms producing electricity at peak times incur much
higher costs than firms generating electricity off peak. If the peak/off peak mix varies
across firms, estimates of the single output cost function may be biased. Empirical
work on multiproduct issues did not begin until the developments reported in the
section above  had taken place.
Mayo (1984) extends the analysis to incorporate the multi-product nature of
operations. In particular, he allows for two types of output, namely electricity and gas.
Using data from 1979, he found that diseconomies of scope set in at small output
levels. Chappell and Wilder (1986) used 1981 data for the same sample but left out
utilities that generate more than 10 percent of their electricity using nuclear power
plants. In contrast to the earlier results, their estimates indicate product specific
economies of scale and economies of scope that are not exhausted even at very large
levels of production. This has triggered a debate whether or not one should include
very different techniques (nuclear vs. other) in the same study (see Mayo, 1986; Gold,
1981; Panzar, 1989).
2.3.3 Mathematical Programming Approach
In the previous sections we have implicitly presumed that all firms are fully efficient.
In this section we relax this assumption and describe methods that may be used to
estimate so-called production frontier functions and measure the efficiencies of firms
relative to these estimated frontiers. The two principal methods that have been used
are data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontiers. We focus here on the
first type. Since the methodology is based on mathematical programming rather than
standard econometric analysis it is more different from the methods discussed above.
For simplicity, consider an industry that produces one output  using one input .
Assume that we have a data on the inputs used and outputs produced for  firms. The
data points are: () ( ) Q Q     , ,..., , 1 1 ..
The essential assumption behind DEA analysis is that the production possibility set is
convex. That is, if two input-output combination () 1 1,   and () 2 2,   are technically
feasible, then also any input-output combination ()  , , where  () 2 1 1    λ λ − + =  and
() 2 1 1    λ λ − + =  with  1 0 ≤ ≤ λ , is technically feasible. Due to the convexity
assumption, the production frontier can be approximated as the piece-wise linear
function that connects the most efficient firms. Next, we can measure the firms
(technical) efficiency and their scale efficiency. The degree of technical efficiency is
defined in the following way. Firm one consumed  1   to produce  1  . If it would have
been possible to produce the same quantity  1   using only  1 1  
W < , then the technical
efficiency of the firm is equal to  1 1  
W . Note that only if  1 1  
W =  the technical38
efficiency is 100 per cent. Otherwise it is lower. Note also that the cost of production
could have been lowered by ( ) 1 1 1   
W −  percent. Thus the degree of technical
efficiency is directly corresponding to the cost-savings potential. If the efficiency is 90
percent, cost could be lowered by 10 percent. The degree of scale inefficiency is
defined in a similar way. If it would have been possible to produce the same quantity
1   using only 
W V   1 1 <  at the most efficient scale, then the firm’s scale efficiency is
equal to 
W V   1 1 . This measure of scale inefficiency is very convenient since it is
expressed in terms of how much cost can be reduced if production is carried out at the
most efficient scale. One may also note that total efficiency is the product of the
technical efficiency and scale efficiency, that is  ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1      
W W V V = .
We can illustrate the application is DEA analysis with a study of Australian
universities (Coelli, 1996).
47 In 1996 the University of New England (UNE) formed a
committee to to look at the performance of UNE relative to 36 other universities in
Australia. Of particular concern was some evidence that suggested that the UNE’s
administration appeared to be larger than some comparable universities. The study
concerned the calender year 1994. The specification of the outputs of a university
administration was a challenging task. But it was decided that the output would be
proxied by two measures: the number of students and the number of staff. Some of the


























 Coelli et al. (1998).
In total the study found that 14 of 36 universities are operating on a too low scale with
increasing returns to scale, and that 13 of the universities were operating on a too
large scale with decreasing returns to scale. The mean scale efficiency was 0.94
indicating that if universities had been operated at optimal scale they would have been
able to save on average six percent (not weighted) of their cost.
                                                          
47 This study is usefully summarized in Coelli et al (1998).39
2.3.4 Engineering Approach
The pioneering study was Bain (1956) who covered twenty different industries. This
approach is built on interviews (or questioners) with engineers whose profession it is
to plan and design new production units and plants. The engineering approach has
also been followed by Pratten (1971), Scherer et al. (1975), Weiss (1975) and more
recently, by Gasmi and Laffont (1999). Most of the engineering studies are relatively
old, and there are reasons to believe that the estimates for many industries may have
changed since the times of the studies. Thus, in our view, there is not much point in
presenting a detailed account of the studies at the level of particular industries.
Moreover, such an extensive survey of the results can be found in Pratten (1988,
Section 5). Instead we point at the more general implications of these studies for
merger control. However, to give some feeling for these studies, we do provide some
results from one of them below.
The central concept in the studies based on the engineering approach is the minimum
efficient scale (MES). In theory, the MES is the level of output at which unit cost is at
its minimum. In practice, the MES is measured as the minimum level of output (or
other measure of size) that must be reached in order to have only a “slight” cost
disadvantage compared to the minimum unit cost. The definition of the minimum
efficient scale differs between different studies (Pratten, 1988). Another source of
difference between different studies is that some studies include all types of costs,
while other studies only focus on production costs and exclude selling and distribution
costs (e.g. Sherer, 1975). Still others go even further and exclude development costs.
The engineering studies produce two important measures. First, in order to estimate
how much that is gained by exploiting scale economies, the studies measure the
increase in cost of operating below the minimum efficient scale. For example, the cost
may be ten percent higher if a plant is operated at half or one third of the MES.
Second, in order to measure the implications of scale economies for (the cost
efficient) industry structure, the studies measure the size of the minimum efficient
scale plant or firm relative to the size of the market varies. For example, if the
minimum efficient scale of a firm is five percent, then the market can support twenty
independent firms and still allow production at minimum cost.
The main result of the engineering studies is that the extent of economies of scale
varies across industries. The increase in cost of operating below the minimum
efficient scale varies, and the size of the minimum efficient scale plant or firm relative
to the size of the market varies. These results have two important implications for
merger policy.
First, the differences between industries support the idea that cost savings related to
scale economies should be evaluated on a case-by-case or at least industry-by-industry
basis. A general presumptions approach, with thresholds common for all industries, is
likely to produce important decision-making errors. At the same time the engineering
studies show that it should be possible for antitrust authorities to collect information
that describes the extent of scale economies in a particular industry.
Second, the engineering studies show that concentration in many markets is often
higher than the concentration necessary for exploiting scale economies. It is therefore
important that only scale economies  are used as an argument to
support horizontal mergers.40
2.3.4.1 Cost Savings Due to Plant Size
Scherer et al. (1975) cover twelve major industries in seven industrialised nations. The
results on the minimum efficient plant scales in the U.S. are summarised in Table 2.
Two measures are given. The second column reports the size of a minimum efficient
scale plant, assuming mid-1960s best-practice technology. Scale is measured by
capacity, output or employment. The third column reports the percentage elevation of
long run unit cost as a consequence of building a and operating plants at one-third the
MES rather than the full MES.
 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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Beer brewing 4.5 million barrels per year
capacity
5.0





37.5 million square yards
per year
7.6
Paints 10 million U.S. gallons per
year
4.4
Petroleum  refining 200000 barrels per day
crude oil capacity
4.8
Leather shoes 1 million pairs per year 1.5
Glass bottles 133000 tons per year 11.0
Portland  cement 7 million 376-pound
barrels per year capacity
26.0
Integrated  steel 4 million tons per year
capacity
11.0
Anti-friction bearings 800 employees 8.0
Refrigerators 800000 units per year 6.5
Automobile storage
batteries




It is not obvious how one should summarise these results. It would have been
instructive to relate the cost differentials connected to size to, for example, the actual
total cost differentials between different plants in these industries. However, even
without such a benchmark, it seems reasonable to say that in most the concerned41
industries, during mid 1960s, the long-run cost disadvantage of operating at sub-
optimal scale is not huge. In half of the industries, the elevation is five percent or less.
But there are exceptions. The cost disadvantage of operating at one-third MES in the
cement industry is 26 percent.
These results indicate that in some industries, but not in most of them, cost savings
related to plant economies of scale can be an important effect of horizontal mergers.
In other words, there exists a gain from evaluating such cost savings on a case-by-case
basis.
(
)   Engineering approach studies indicate that cost savings
related to plant economies of scale differ substantially between different
industries. These differences indicate that such cost savings should be
evaluated on a case-by-case or at least industry-by-industry basis.
However, the picture provided by the above table is very incomplete. The analysis
must also take into account economies of multiple-plant operation. And, perhaps more
important, in order to understand the implications for merger policy, the MES must be
related to the size of the market.
2.3.4.2 Scale Economies in Relation to the Size of the Market
It is crucial to point out that the cost minimising industry structure, and thus the
rationale for mergers, depends on the interplay between scale economies and the size
of the market. Consider a single product industry with increasing returns to scale up to
the production of 
0(6   and thereafter decreasing returns to scale. Thus, 
0(6   is the
minimum efficient scale (MES). If consumers demand exactly 
0(6   units of the good,
or less, then the cost minimising organisation of the industry requires that all
production is carried out in a single firm. Thus, mergers up this level reduce cost. On
the other hand, if consumers demand 
0(6  2  units of the good, cost minimisation
requires that production is divided between two separate firms. In this case, a merger
between two duopoly firms will increase the cost of production. Thus, in order to
support a merger with efficiency claims, it is not sufficient to show that the
technology exhibits scale economies in some range. It must be demonstrated that there
are scale economies in the relevant range. In many industries, it is likely that this
qualification is crucial.
Economists have estimated minimum efficient scale and compared the estimates with
observed levels of market concentration. Typical results from one study, using the
engineering approach, are reported in Table 3, showing how important multiplant
economies of scale were in the late 1960s for twelve U.S. industries. Column (1)
shows estimates of how many MES plants a firm needs to operate in order to have not
more than slight overall handicap vis-à-vis companies securing all multiplant
economies. Column (2) translates the column (1) judgements into an estimate of how
large a share of the U.S. market an enterprise needed to realise these economies. In
effect it summarises the imperatives for high concentration at the nation-wide level. In
only three of the twelve industries (refrigerators, brewing, and perhaps cigarettes)
where oligopolistic national industry structures (defined as four-firm concentration
ratio above 40) compelled. However, in several other industries, transportation costs
were sufficiently high to confine the sales of any single plant to a regional market. As
a result, exploiting scale economies required oligopolistic industry structures also in42
many glass bottle, petroleum, steel, and cement markets. Column (3) indicates the
average market share held by individual firms among the industries’ three leading
producers in 1970. By comparing column (3) with column (2) it appears that in the
United States, concentration was much larger than the operation of efficient firms
would dictate. In weaving and batteries, the Big Three firms were ten times as large as
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: Scherer et al. (1975, pp 334-6).
The important conclusion from this table is the following:
(
0   Comparing minimum efficient scale with the size of the
market shows that real world concentration may be considerably higher than
the imperatives of scale economies require.43
The table does not reveal the reason for the excessive concentration. However, at least
one potential explanation is the firms’ strategies to build market power. Another
potential reason may be that economies of scale in marketing have not been properly
accounted for in the studies. Be that as it may, these empirical results show that it is
important that only scale economies in the relevant range should be used as a defence
for a horizontal merger.
2.3.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this section, we review the empirical literature on economies of scale. We both
provide a brief overview of empirical estimates of scale economies in several
industries, and discuss the methodologies that are used. However, since many of these
studies are rather old, and since scale economies in many industries are likely to
change over time, as a result of technological development, we do not attempt to
provide a detailed account of the measurement of scale economies for all industries.
Rather, the main purpose is to extract the general conclusions, from this literature, that
are relevant for the discussion of an efficiency defence in merger control.
The primary finding is that the exploitation of scale economies is a source of
substantial cost savings in some, but not all, industries. Economies of scale are often
present at low volumes of output, and exhausted at larger volumes. In our view, the
empirical results have an important implication for merger policy. The variability of
scale economies across industries and different output volumes support the idea that
cost savings should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, i.e. an efficiency defence.
Moreover, the empirical literature shows that concentration in many industries has
gone further than motivated by scale economies alone. Thus, in evaluating mergers it
is important that only scale economies in the relevant range should be used as a
defence for a horizontal merger. In sum:
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In order for antitrust authorities to take cost savings related to scale economies into
account, they need some methodology to assess the importance of these economies.
Therefore, we also provide a short introduction to the empirical methodologies that
have been used to estimate economies of scale. Essentially, three different methods
have been used to study the relationship between size and unit cost. The econometric
approach uses statistical techniques to analyse cost-output data from some collection
of firms. The mathematical programming approach is similar in that it also analyses
cost-output data, but using linear programming. The engineering approach relies on
interviews with engineers who design new production units.
In our view, all of these methodologies are useful for antitrust authorities, albeit in
different ways. The already existing studies based on the econometric and
mathematical programming approaches have produced useful “background
knowledge.” Whenever a case has to be decided concerning some industry, these
studies can give a first hint if scale economies are important in that particular industry.
What is the order of magnitude of potential cost savings? Is it reasonable to carry out
a more detailed study?44
However, for several reasons the econometric approach is probably not suitable for
the antitrust authorities to carry out such more detailed investigation. The main reason
is data limitation. In order to estimate scale economies, cost and output data also from
firms not participating in the merger is necessary. Another reason is that the
econometric approach does not identify the sources of scale economies, which is
important in order for assessing merger specificity. Estimates of scale economies do
not indicate the time it takes for a merger to achieve cost savings related to scale
economies. In contrast, the engineering approach should lend itself for such more
detailed studies in particular cases. In particular, the engineering approach may supply
an “incremental analysis,” that is focus on the factors that will be affected by the
merger. In sum:
"
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The relevant question for competition policy is to which extend the total cost savings,
as discussed in the previous chapter, affect the policy objectives. For this reason, it is
necessary to be more explicit about policy goals of merger regulation. As discussed in
Röller, Stennek and Verboven (2000), several objectives are frequently mentioned in
the competition policy debate.
•   Consumer surplus.  A first objective upon which merger analysis may be
based is the protection of consumer interests. If this is the case, the central focus of
merger analysis is on the competitive, or price effects, of mergers
•   Total  surplus. Another objective may be to further both consumer and
producer interests. Total surplus may operationally be defined as the sum of
consumer and producer surplus. More generally, one may give different weights to
consumer and producer surplus.
•   Other  objectives. These include the promotion of European integration,
employment, regional balance, viability of small firms, and competitiveness of
national firms on international markets. The concern with the preservation of
employment has often been a political concern in proposed mergers. In principle,
employment considerations should be taken into account in a full cost-benefit
analysis of mergers. In practice, a merger policy designed to preserve old
production structure is presumably not the best way to deal with the employment
objective in the long run. See for example Jenny (1997) and Crampton for more
on the employment objective.
Depending on which policy objective one has in mind, the total cost savings should be
evaluated differently. In our analysis below we focus exclusively on the first policy
goals, the protection of consumer surplus. The reason is that this goal is typically the
main objective in merger control.
Our focus on consumer surplus implies that we are mainly interested in the price
effects from mergers. There are, however, also reasons to be interested in the price
effects if one adopts the producers’ own point of view. Indeed, understanding the
price effects is essential to evaluate changes in the merging firms’ competitive
position. If a merger leads to a reduction in price, the merging firms typically realize
an increase in their market share. In contrast, if a merger leads to a price increase, the
merging firms are likely to experience a shrinking market share. While the merging
firms’ profits may still increase in this case, this would be caused by increased market
power and thus not by an increased competitiveness.
The price effects from a merger can be decomposed into two components:46
•   The price increase from in increase in market power, holding the merging
firms’ costs constant.
•   The price reduction from an improvement in the firms’ competitive position.
The price reduction from the improvement in the firms competitive position will be
strong to the extent that (i) the realized cost savings are marginal cost savings; and (ii)
the cost savings are passed on to at least some extent to consumers.
The total price effect from the merger is therefore negative if pass-on of marginal cost
savings is sufficiently high to outweigh the market power effects.
48 This shows the
importance of assessing pass-on of cost savings into consumer prices in merger
analysis. . Generally speaking, the greater is the pass-on, the more likely a merger is
going to decrease price in the presence of cost savings. For example, if 50 percent of
the cost savings are passed on to consumers, then a merger decreases price if the
realized cost savings are at least twice the percentage amount of the price effects from
increased market power. If cost savings are fully passed on to consumers, then a
merger decreases price if the realized cost savings are at least the same percentage
amount as the price effects from increased market power.
These examples illustrate the importance of understanding the degree of pass-on to
evaluate the full price effects from mergers. What are the relevant determinants of
pass-on? Do technological conditions affect the degree of pass-on? What is the role
played by competition? How important is the distinction between pass-on of firm-
specific and industry-wide cost savings? What is the empirical evidence regarding
pass-on? We take up these questions in this chapter with the purpose of obtaining a
better understanding into the role of efficiencies in mergers.
$ %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3.2.1 Two measures of pass-on
As an introductory remark, it is instructive to note that pass-on of marginal cost
savings can be measured in various ways. The choice of measure depends on what one
wants to emphasize.
One approach is to compute how the absolute price level would change when the
marginal cost is changed by, say, one unit. We refer to this measure as 	
"
	. A second approach is to compute how the price would change in percentage terms,
when the marginal cost is changed by, say, one percent. This gives a measure of
"	, or, in other words, the "	. Both measures will be used
throughout the text.
In fact, it can be verified that the absolute pass-on is simply equal to the pass-on
elasticity, multiplied by the ratio of price to marginal cost. Since this ratio is typically
greater than one (when firms have positive markups), the absolute pass-on is typically
greater than the pass-on elasticity. Only under perfect competition (when markups are
zero) both measures are the same.
                                                          
48 Assume that the merger tends to increase price by dP/P percent as a result of the first effect. Then, for
the net effect to be non-positive, it is necessary that  (dc/c)(dP/dc)(c/p)≤ -dP/P, where (dc/c) is the
percentage cost reduction, and β =(dP/dc)(c/p) is the pass-on elasticity. The pass-on elasticity indicates
by how many percent the price would be reduced if cost is reduced by one percent.47
3.2.2 Pass-on of industry wide cost savings
We begin with a discussion of pass-on of cost savings that are realized by all firms in
the industry. While cost savings from mergers are typically realized only in the level
of the merging firms, understanding pass-on of industry-wide cost savings is a useful
starting point. We can draw from a well-established theoretical literature on
competition and monopoly and add generalizations to oligopolies. Furthermore, we
will show how industry-level and firm-level pass-on are related to each other. This is
useful, since the largest part of the empirical literature, which we review in section
3.3, has been concerned with industry-level pass-on.
Sections 3.2.2.1 to 3.2.2.3 consider pass-on of industry wide cost savings under
alternative forms of competition, assuming products are homogeneous. Section 3.2.2.4
investigates how the results generalize to differentiated products.
3.2.2.1 A competitive industry
Consider first pass-on of industry-wide cost savings in a competitive industry. This
case is treated in the context of taxation by Bishop (1968), and is well explained and
illustrated in several Economics textbooks, see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1992). It
is useful to review this case, before considering more complicated market structures
with market power.
In a competitive industry firms choose production levels to maximize profits, taking
the market price as given. An individual firm’s supply is then given by the production
level at which the marginal cost of production equals the market price. The aggregate
supply curve is simply the sum of the individual firms’ supplies, as depicted by the
curve (
6)* in Figure 1. Aggregate demand is the sum of the individual consumers’
demand, shown by the curve(
’)+* in Figure 1. The equilibrium market price is
the price at which supply is equal to demand, (
6=(
’)(,. It is given by the solution
to *)+*, as shown by the intersection of the two curves in Figure 1.
We are interested in assessing pass-on of an industry-wide cost saving, i.e. the effect
of a decrease in the marginal costs on the price level. More precisely, we want to
compute the industry-wide pass-on elasticity, defined as the percentage increase in the
market price cause by a percentage increase in marginal costs. To address this
question, it will be convenient to use the inverse of the aggregate supply curve *,
which is the aggregate marginal cost curve, denoted by *)'-.(
6. The parameter '
is used to analyse the effects of percentage changes in marginal costs.Using this
curve, the equilibrium market price is given by the condition:
)) ( ( * + '-. * = .






























which would also be the measure for absolute  pass-on.







− = ε  is the price elasticity of demand, measuring the effect
of an increase in the price by 1 percent on the percentage reduction in demand. A high
price elasticity of demand (a high ε) means that consumers are very price sensitive,







= ω  measures the
effect of an increase in the quantity produced by 1 percent on the percentage change in
marginal cost. It is, in fact, the inverse of the elasticity of supply, and it may be
positive or negative. If ω  is negative, then marginal costs decline as output increases,
which can be depicted by a downward sloping supply curve. In contrast, if ω  is
positive, then marginal costs increase with output, depicted by an upward sloping
supply curve. This indicates the presence of capacity constraints. If ω  is close to zero
firms, face little capacity constraints, which can be depicted by a flat marginal cost
curve.
The formula for the industry wide pass-on elasticity under perfect competition thus
stresses the importance of the slope of the demand and supply curves. To illustrate, we
begin our discussion by assuming that ω  is positive or zero. Figure 2a assumes that
demand is somewhat elastic while supply is upward sloping, meaning that firms face
increasing marginal costs as they increase their production. Consider a reduction in
marginal cost by 20 percent. Holding production levels constant, perfect competition
would induce firms to lower their prices by 20 percent. However, such a price
reduction would induce consumers to buy more. To bring the market back in
equilibrium, firms need to produce more. Yet since they face increasing marginal
costs (capacity constraints), they are only willing to do this if the price can increase.
As a result, price will not decrease by 20 percent but by a lower amount.
Pass-on can only be complete if either one of two conditions is met: (i) demand is
perfectly inelastic, consumers are very price insensitive (ε=0 as in Figure 2b); (ii)
supply is perfectly elastic, capacity is available in unlimited amounts so that marginal
costs are constant (ω =0 as in Figure 2c). For example, if marginal costs are constant,
then a cost reduction by 20 percent corresponds to a price reduction by 20 percent,
since new demand at the lower price can be easily produced without affecting
marginal costs. But more generally, pass-on is less complete the more consumers
respond to price changes (high elasticity of demand) and the more producers are
capacity constrained (low elasticity of supply). For a perfectly elastic (flat) demand
curve and increasing marginal costs (ε=infinity and ω >0), a marginal cost reduction is
not passed on at all to consumers. Similarly, there is no pass-on if there are very
severe capacity constraints, i.e. for a perfectly inelastic (vertical) supply curve
(ω =infinity).
This discussion highlights that the degree of pass-on crucially depends on the
consumers’ responses to price reductions and on the firms’ ability to expand
production. This can be summarized in the following observation.49
(
* In a competitive industry, pass-on of a reduction in marginal
costs will be more complete, as consumers respond less to price reductions and
as producers can expand production more easily without raising their marginal
costs by too much (little capacity constraints).
Several empirical studies have emphasized the importance of capacity constraints in
explaining incomplete pass-on. For example, in international trade, studies by
Bhagwati (1988), Branson (1989) or Knetter (1995) have investigated whether
incomplete pass-through of exchange rates is caused by the presence of quantitative
import quota restraints. Import quota constraints may be viewed as an example of
severe capacity constraints in the country of import.
This discussion is based on the assumption that the supply curve is upward sloping,
i.e. the firms’ marginal costs increase as production increases. In practice, when the
industry is subject to increasing returns to scale, it is possible that the firms’ marginal
costs are decreasing as production increases, i.e. ω <0.
49 In this case, there will be
overshifting: a reduction in marginal cost by, say, 20 percent would lead to a reduction
in price by more than 20 percent (unless demand is perfectly inelastic). The intuition
for this is clear. At a constant production level, competitive firms would lower their
price by 20 percent. This induces consumers to buy more. The required additional
output can be produced at a lower marginal cost since marginal cost is decreasing in
production. This induces competitive firms to reduce the price further until a market
equilibrium is reached.
(
*In a competitive industry, there will be overshooting if the
supply curve is downward sloping, i.e. marginal costs decrease as producers
expand production.
The extent of pass-on in a competitive industry is thus largely empirical question:
there may be incomplete pass-on, complete pass-on, or even overshooting.
Nevertheless, there seems to be a common acceptance that pass-on is complete (pass-
on elasticity of one) in a competitive industry. This can be rationalized if one is
willing to make some additional assumptions: (1) the competitive industry is
characterized by free entry and (2) all firms have access to the same technology and
production factors. Under these assumptions the marginal cost curve is flat and supply
is perfectly elastic (ω =infinity), so that pass-on is complete.
(
** In a competitive industry, pass-on of a reduction in marginal
cost savings is complete if the marginal cost curve is flat. For some industries,
this may occur in the long run, when entry is free and firms have access to the
same technologies and production factors.
While these assumptions may be more or less justified in the long-run, they are not
likely to hold in the short-run, since entry and exit takes time, imitation of
competitors’ technologies may be difficult, and production factors are not perfectly
mobile. For these reasons, even in competitive industries the assessment of the pass-
on rate is an empirical question.
                                                          
49 We make the standard stability assumption that marginal cost is not decreasing too much, i.e. -ω <ε at
the equilibrium, so that the supply curve intersects the demand curve from below..50
3.2.2.2 Monopoly
We now take another extreme and assume that there is only one single firm in the
industry. We ask the question whether and by how much a monopolist will pass on
cost reductions to consumers. In contrast to a competitive firm, which takes the
market price as given, a monopolist takes into account that it can influence the market
price. Its profits are *( minus total costs .(. Assuming as before that demand is
equal to supply so that demand is given by ()+*, the monopolist’s profits are given
by total revenues minus total costs:
)) ( ( ) ( * + '. * *+ −
The profit-maximizing price is given by the following condition:
() )) ( (
d
d
) ( * + '-. *
*
+
* + − + ,( 2 )
where '-.( is as before the marginal cost curve.
The first term measures the gain from a price increase by one unit: it is proportional to
the total sales at the current price level. The second term measures the loss from a
price increase: this is proportional to the markup multiplied by the reduction in sales
caused by the price increase. We can rewrite (2) in elasticity form as:
ε
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In words, the percentage markup is inversely related to the price elasticity of demand.
Only if the price elasticity of demand is infinite, the markup is zero, so that price is
equal to marginal cost. We note from (2’) that a monopolist always operates at the
elastic portion of the demand curve: since marginal costs are positive, it must be that
ε>1. Intuitively, at the inelastic portion of the demand curve (ε<1), it always pays for a
monopoly to raise its price.
We can follow a similar approach as under perfect competition and totally
differentiate the monopoly condition.
50 This gives the following formula for relative
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which measures the effect of a percentage marginal cost change in the percentage
price change To measure absolute pass-on, one simply has to multiply the pass-on
elasticity by the price to marginal cost ratio, as discussed in section 3.1.
The first two terms in the numerator of expression (3) are exactly the same as in the
case of perfect competition. Consequently, it is again true that pass-on is more
complete as consumers respond less to price reductions and as producers can expand
production without raising their marginal costs by too much (see Observation 3.1). To
abstract from these effects, assume the marginal cost curve is flat (ω =0), so that pass-
on would be complete under perfect competition (see Observation 3.3).
                                                          
50 See, for example, Feenstra (1989), Marston (1990), or Knetter (1993)51
We can then focus on the third part in the numerator of expression (3). This contains







= . It may be positive or negative. If η>0, then a price increase leads to a
higher price elasticity of demand, i.e. consumers become more price sensitive. This is
the most intuitive scenario. If η<0, then a price increase, leads to a decrease in the
price elasticity of demand; if η=0, then the price elasticity of demand is independent
of price changes.
To interpret the role of the parameter η in assessing pass-on, suppose that the
monopolist experiences a reduction in marginal cost of 20 percent and initially
completely passes this on to consumers by lowering its price. This will cause an
increase in demand, which the monopolist can easily accommodate since we assume a
flat marginal cost curve (ω =0). However, the lower price may cause the monopolist to
reconsider its markup strategy. There are three possibilities, as can be seen from the
markup formula (2’). First, if the elasticity of demand is unaffected by price changes
(η=0), then the optimal monopoly markup is a fixed percentage of cost. The
monopolist never adjusts its percentage margins, so that (relative) pass-on is
complete. Second, if the elasticity of demand is increasing in price (η>0), then a price
reduction would decreases the elasticity of demand. A lower price elasticity calls for
an upward adjustment of the optimal monopoly markup. The monopolist thus prefers
to raise its percentage markup and pass on only part of the cost reduction. Third, if the
elasticity of demand is decreasing (η<0), lowering price increases the elasticity of
demand, so that the optimal monopoly markup decreases. In this case, the monopolist
prefers to pass on more than the cost reduction by lowering its markup, so that there
will be overshooting.
We can summarize this discussion as follows.
(
*1 Suppose the marginal cost curve is flat (ω =0). If consumers
become more price sensitive when price increases (η>0), a monopolist raises
its percentage markup after a marginal cost reduction so that relative pass-on is
incomplete. If consumers become less price sensitive when price increases
(η<0), a monopolist reduces its percentage markup after a marginal cost
reduction so that there is overshooting.
This discussion shows the important role of market power in assessing pass on. A
monopolist may respond to cost reductions by lowering or raising its markup,
depending on the curvature of the price elasticity of demand. The central question for
assessing pass-on when monopoly market power is present is thus whether the price
elasticity of demand is increasing or decreasing in price. To gain some further
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This expression shows that the sign of η depends on the 

 of the demand
curve, as measured by 
2 2 dP / d + . If the demand curve is concave or linear all terms
are positive, so that η>0, i.e. the price elasticity of demand is increasing in price.
Hence for concave or linear demand curves (
2 2 dP / d + ≤ 0), firms increase markups52
after a marginal cost reduction so that pass-on is incomplete (assuming flat marginal
costs). Only if the demand curve is sufficiently convex (
2 2 dP / d +  sufficiently high) it
is possible that firms reduce their markups after a marginal cost reduction so that there
is overshooting.
In practice, while one cannot rule out the case of overshooting, it is more reasonable
to expect that pass-on of cost reductions will be incomplete. To see this, consider how
the value of the price elasticity of demand for two extreme values of marginal cost.
First, if marginal cost equal zero, then by the inverse elasticity rule, the price elasticity
of demand is equal to one. Second, if marginal cost is so high that only the smallest
possible amount is consumed, then the price elasticity of demand must be very large.
Hence, the price elasticity of demand drops considerably as one moves from the
highest to the lowest possible cost level. Only for a range of prices it may be that the
price elasticity of demand increases as price falls. Assuming that marginal costs are
flat, we conclude that overshooting, i.e. lowering the markup in response to a marginal
cost reduction, is a rather unusual scenario.
Even if one rules out the possibility of overshooting as implausible, the degree of
pass-on cannot easily be pinned down to a small range. To illustrate, consider the
commonly used specification of linear demand (
2 2 dP / d + =0) while still assuming flat
marginal costs (ω ). Substituting (4) into (3) one can compute that the pass-on
elasticity of a monopolist is then equal to (ε-1)/2ε. This implies that the pass-on
elasticity is always less than 0.5. In contrast, the commonly used specification of a
constant elasticity demand (η=0) implies that pass-on is complete. This illustrates that
one can obtain drastically different conclusion regarding pass-on, by simply changing
the demand specification. Assessing the pass-on of cost savings by a firm with
monopoly market power is thus, more than under competition, an empirical question.
3.2.2.3 Oligopoly models
To explain the role of competition for assessing pass-on, we consider an oligopolistic
industry where firms can influence the market price. One may distinguish between
two types of oligopoly models: the Cournot and the Bertrand model. In the Cournot
model, each firm chooses a quantity to maximize profits, taking as given the quantity
set by the other firms. In the Bertrand model, each firm chooses a price to maximize
profits, taking as given the price set by the other firms.
Consider first a Cournot model with N firms, where each firm i operates at a constant,
but not necessarily identical marginal cost cL. Market demand *)*( is now
represented as the inverse of the demand function ()+*; it is downward sloping.
The constant marginal cost assumptions allows us to abstract from the possibility of
incomplete pass-on or overshooting stemming from, respectively upward or
downward sloping marginal cost functions. Except for this assumption,, this is a fairly
general set-up, as described in more detail by for example Levin (1991).
51 We are
interested in finding the industry-wide pass-on elasticity, which we define as the
percentage reduction in price when all firms reduce their marginal cost by one percent.
A firm i producing a quantity qi obtains a profit equal to:
                                                          
51 For example, some weak stability assumptions for guaranteeing existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium are required.53
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Each firm i chooses a quantity qi to maximize profit given the quantity chosen by the
other firms. The profit maximizing quantity for each firm i must satisfy the condition
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This condition must hold for every firm to have a Cournot equilibrium. As under







where L)L/Q is the market share of firm . Intuitively, a firm obtains a high markup if
the price elasticity of demand ε is low (as in the monopoly case) and if its market
share is high. In the special case in which L)1, a single firm has 100 percent of the
market and the monopoly condition holds.
We can add up these conditions for all firms to obtain the following equation from
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The market price can then be computed by substituting the Cournot market quantity in
the inverse demand function *)*(. We can compute the pass-on elasticity by
totally differentiating this condition. Some calculations show that the industry-wide
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where η is the elasticity of the price elasticity of demand as defined previously for the
monopoly case. To obtain a measure of absolute pass-on, one would need to multiply
the pass-on elasticity by the ratio of price to the average of the firms’ marginal cost.
One can see that the industry-wide pass-on elasticity depends on the number of
competing firms N, but is independent on the distribution of market shares in the
industry. It thus does not matter whether the industry consists of, say, four equally
sized firms, or whether instead there is one dominant firm and three small ones.
The pass-on elasticity (5) covers monopoly and perfect competition as special cases
(for the case of constant marginal costs). More specifically, if N=1 the monopoly
formula holds. As the number of firms N increases (and assuming η>0), the pass-on
elasticity increases, until it becomes unity as the number of firms N approaches
infinity. As in the monopoly case, when the price elasticity of demand increases with
price (η>0), firms find it optimal to increase their markup after a reduction in
marginal cost. We can summarize this as follows.
(
*2 Suppose that the marginal cost curve is flat and the price
elasticity of demand increases with price. Cournot firms raise their markups54
after an industry wide marginal cost reduction so that relative pass-on is
incomplete. As the number of firms in the industry increases, pass-on becomes
more complete.
McCorriston et al. (1995) consider an oligopoly with identical firms and constant
marginal costs. Conduct is modeled through a conjectural variation parameter θ . This
parameter is often used in empirical work (see Bresnahan, 1989) to cover a broad
range of oligopoly models as special cases, including perfect competition, Cournot,
Bertrand and cartel. In the symmetric Cournot model the conjectural variation would
be equal to 1/N. McCorriston et al. consider the case in which the cost of only one
production factor decreases; the share of this production factor is called α . Assuming






















This is very similar to what we found before. The formula first shows the role of
conduct through the conjectural variation parameter: pass-on increases as the market
becomes more competitive (lower θ ). The formula also shows that it is important to
know whether or not the cost reduction applies to all production factors. If the cost
reduction only applies to a fraction α  of the marginal costs, then the pass-on elasticity
has to be adjusted correspondingly.
(
*3 The pass-on elasticity increases as conduct becomes more
competitive. Furthermore, the pass-on elasticity is proportional to the share of
the production factors for which the cost reduction applies.
It is important to bare in mind this observation when interpreting the results obtained
in the empirical literature. In particular, if a low pass-on elasticity is found, this may
simply be because the empirical study only considered one component of costs.
Next consider the Bertrand model of oligopoly, where firms compete by choosing
prices taking as given the prices of their competitors. Assume again that firms have
constant but not necessarily identical marginal cost. If products are homogeneous,
then the price will equal to the marginal cost of the firm with the second lowest
marginal cost and the market share of the lowest cost firm will be 100 percent. This is
true no matter how many firms are in the industry. In this case, one can easily see that
pass-on of an industry-wide marginal cost change will be complete, no matter how
many firms are in the industry. The Bertrand model with homogeneous goods thus has
the rather unappealing property that the number of firms has no influence on the
degree of pass-on. In the next section, it will become clear that this is no longer the
case if one assumes that product are differentiated.
3.2.2.4 Industries with product differentiation
Up to now we have assumed that consumers view the products offered by different
firms as perfect substitutes. As a result, there is only one price in the industry; if there
were two prices, than the products at the highest price would obtain zero market share.
With homogeneous products pass-on of marginal cost savings is therefore defined
straightforwardly in terms of the single prevailing price, independent of the firms
market shares. If products are differentiated, things are more complicated. Different55
products are typically sold at different prices and have different sales. A natural way
to define pass-on would be to construct a price index for the industry, where the
products are weighted according to sales. Pass-on could then be defined as the effect
of a reduction in marginal cost on this price index (holding the weights fixed). A
justification for this approach is that the change in this price index when all prices
change by one unit is exactly the opposite of the change in consumer surplus, if we
ignore income effects. To see this, let consumer surplus be equal to:
) , ,..., , ( 2 1       1 =
where ￿	
￿		
1￿ is the indirect utility function of a representative consumer in
the industry. Applying Roy’s identity, it can be checked that the change in consumer
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where qi are the sales of product i. When we assess pass-on of cost reductions on the
sales based price index, we are thus looking at pass-on to consumers.
The pattern of product differentiation in a market may take many forms and can differ
from market to market. Generally speaking, one may view competition in industries
with product differentiation to be either localized or global. If competition is
localized, then products are direct substitutes of only a few other products in the
market. Many products then only compete indirectly with each other through a chain
of price responses by competitors. In contrast, if competition is global, then all
products are direct substitutes for all other products in the market.
52 A simple form of
global competition occurs when all products are symmetric substitutes for each other.
An example of this is the popular logit model, which we will use to illustrate how to
measure pass-on. It will be convenient to focus on absolute pass-on (rather than
relative pass-on).
Suppose there are  differentiated products, ; consumers either choose one
unit of their most preferred product, or they decide not to buy anything, in which case
they choose the outside good 0. According to the logit model, the market share L for





) / ) exp((








where vi measures the intrinsic utility for the product, and µ is a parameter measuring
the degree of substitution. The total sales 
L for product  are equal to the market share
L
times the total number of potential consumers, . Assuming a flat marginal cost
curve ci for each product , the profits from product  are given by      L L L ) ( − .
We consider pass-on of an industry-wide marginal cost reduction in two kinds of
market structure: a monopoly and a Bertrand oligopoly. A monopolist takes into
account that a price increase does not only reduce the sales of the product itself, but
also increase the sales of the other products it sells. The monopolist thus sets prices to
maximize its total profits, taking into account the profit effects for  products it sells.
                                                          
52 See Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1993) for a detailed analysis of models of product
differentiation. Models of localized competition are sometimes referred to as the Kaldorian approach,
whereas models of global competition are referred to as the Chamberlinian approach.56
The result is that the monopolist charges a markup that is inversely proportional to the
price elasticity of demand for all products. This generalizes the monopoly markup rule
for homogeneous products given by (2’). Specifically for the logit model, this rule
translates into the following condition:
0 
  L L
µ
= −
Intuitively, the monopolist charges equal markups for all its products, and these
markups are higher the less attractive is the outside good (low elasticity of market
demand). One can totally differentiate this condition to obtain the following
expression for the absolute pass-on, i.e. the effect of a unit marginal cost change on
the industry price index:
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This simple condition implies that pass-on of a unit cost reduction for all products will
not be passed completely into the consumer price index. In particular, a monopolist
selling differentiated products of the logit form never passes on more than 1/4 of a
cost reduction (which occurs when the outside good has a market share of 1/2).
This can be contrasted with pass-on in an oligopoly. Suppose that there are N firms
each selling one of the differentiated products. Each firm takes into account that a
price increase reduces the sales of its own product, but does not consider the effect on
the sales of the other products. The resulting markup is inversely related to the price
elasticity at the level of the individual product, which is greater than the price
elasticity of demand for all products together. The closer the products are substitutes,
the higher the product-level price elasticities of demand, and the lower the markups.
















From this condition one can derive the following expression for pass-on of an
industry-wide unit marginal cost change on the price index:
























This is a rather complicated formula, yet it has several interesting properties. First, it
can be shown that the pass-on expression is greater than the expression in (6). The
logit example thus illustrates that also for differentiated products there is more pass-
on under oligopoly competition than under monopoly. Second, it can easily be seen
that pass-on is always less than one. For symmetric products, it can also be verified
pass-on becomes more complete as the number of firms increases; pass-on become
complete as the number of products become very large.57
(
*) Suppose that the marginal cost curve is flat and products are
differentiated according to the logit model. Absolute pass-on is incomplete, yet
greater under competition than under monopoly. As the number of competing
products becomes very large, absolute pass-on becomes complete.
Note that Observation 3.7 is only true for the logit model. It is well-known, see for
example Froeb and Werden (1994), that the logit model generates price elasticities of
demand that are increasing in price. For this reason, it implies that firms absorb cost
changes partially by adjusting their markups. In other models of product
differentiation, such as the linear demand model or the CES model, markup
adjustment may be lower, so that it is possible that absolute pass-on would be more
than complete.
3.2.3 Pass-on of firm-specific cost savings
We now go to the question that is most relevant for merger analysis: how are 
 cost savings passed on to consumer prices? In answering this question we are
also concerned with the relationship between pass-on of industry-wide cost savings.
Understanding this relationship will prove to be very important since our empirical
review will make it clear that previous research efforts have traditionally been most
concerned with pass-on of industry-wide cost savings.
3.2.3.1 A competitive industry
In a perfectly competitive industry, each firm’s demand curve becomes horizontal. In
other words, the elasticity of each firm’s perceived demand becomes infinitely large
(consumers become very price sensitive). Under such conditions, a firm has no
incentive to pass-on any cost changes. It acts simply as a price taker, and would only
adjust its produced quantity in response to a marginal cost change. See Yde and Vita
(1996) for a graphical illustration.
3.2.3.2 Oligopoly with homogeneous products
First, we consider firm-level pass on in a Cournot oligopoly as introduced in section
3.2.2.3. Each firm chooses an output level to maximize its profits. The condition for
profit-maximization can be totally differentiated as before, but now varying only the
marginal cost of a specific firm , holding the marginal costs of the other firms





















where the notation is the same as before. To measure the absolute pass-on, one would
have to multiply the pass-on elasticity by firm i’s price to marginal cost ratio.
The formula (7) looks quite close to the industry-wide pass-on elasticity given by (3).
The denominator is in fact the same, showing that the price elasticity of demand ε, the
elasticity of the elasticity η and the number of firms has a similar influence on the
firm-specific pass-on elasticity as on the industry-wide pass-on elasticity. The
numerator is different from (3). It contains the market share of firm , who experiences
the cost reduction. It shows that the pass-on elasticity is larger for firms with a smaller58
market share. Intuitively, this is because small firms are firms with high marginal
costs and little market power.
The relationship between the firm-specific pass-on elasticity τi and the industry-wide
elasticity τ can be discussed by computing the ratio between the two:
) 1 /( ) ( / − − = ε ε τ τ  L
5 5
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Note that this ratio is independent of the elasticity of the elasticity. In fact, the
denominator of this ratio is simply the sum of the numerator over all firms. Since ε
must be greater than si, this implies that this ratio is always less than one, i.e. the firm-
specific pass-on is necessarily less than industry-wide pass-on in the Cournot model.
It is possible to say a bit more about the relationship between firm-specific and
industry-wide pass-on. The ratio τi/τ implies that a firm with a market share equal to
the average market share in the industry (i.e. 1/N) has a pass-on elasticity that is
exactly equal to a fraction 1/N of the industry-wide pass-on elasticity. For example, if
there were four firms in the industry, then a firm with a market share of 25 percent
would have a pass-on elasticity of exactly 25 percent of the industry-wide pass-on
elasticity. A firm with a higher market share than the average market share in the
industry will necessarily pass-on less than the fraction 1/N, so that pass-on of a cost
reduction by such firms is likely to be small. In contrast, a firm with a lower market
share than the average in the industry will pass-on more than the fraction 1/N. If all
firms are identical (with market shares of 1/N), then the firm-specific pass-on
elasticity is exactly 1/N of the industry wide pass-on elasticity.
(
*0 Suppose that the marginal cost curve is flat. In a Cournot
industry a firm-specific cost reduction is passed on less than an industry-wide
cost reduction.  The higher a firm’s market share is, the lower is the firm
specific pass on.
One can also easily compute the pass-on elasticity for multiple firms, i.e. the N
F
merging firms. One simply has to reinterpret the market share in (7) as the joint (post-
merger) market share of the N
F firms. This shows that pass-on from cost savings is
lower the greater is the merging firms’ joint market share. The special case of
Dornbusch’ (1987) analysis obtain if one considers pass-on of cost savings by N
F
symmetric firms and a constant price elasticity of demand (η=0).
53 In this case, the
pass-on elasticity is equal to the firms joint market share N
F/N: the greater the firms’
joint market share, the closer pass-on is to unity.
Now consider firm-level pass-on in a Bertrand oligopoly where firms choose prices
rather than quantities. As explained in section 3.2.2.3 in such an industry firms set a
price equal to the marginal cost of the second lowest cost firm, and the market share
of the lowest cost firm is 100 percent. In such an industry a cost saving by the
dominant, low cost firm is not passed on at all to consumers, whereas a cost saving by
the second lowest cost firm is passed on completely. This is in line with the results of
the Cournot model: larger firms pass-on less than smaller firms and firm-specific
pass-on is less than industry-wide pass-on. Pass-on of cost savings by multiple firms
will be complete if and only if the second lowest cost firm is involved. Since the
Bertrand model with homogeneous products yields a quite unrealistic situation in
                                                          
53 Dornbusch (1987) did a Cournot analysis with symmetric firms in the context of analyzing exchange
rate pass-through.59
which one firm obtains the whole market, we now turn to the case where products are
differentiated.
3.2.3.3 Oligopoly with differentiated products
To illustrate pass-on of firm specific cost savings we again use the logit model of
product differentiation, which has the property that products compete symmetrically
with each other. We will again focus on absolute rather than relative pass-on in the
logit model because this is more convenient.
As before, the condition for profit maximization can be totally differentiated, now
varying only the marginal cost of a single firm and holding the cost of the other firms
constant. First consider the product-specific pass-on rate under the hypothesis that
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Product-specific pass-on is simply a fraction of industry-wide pass-on, where this
fraction is proportional to the product’s market share, i.e.  ) 1 /( / 0  L
$ $
L − = τ τ .
Consistent with the findings for the Cournot model, a cost reduction for a single
product is thus passed on by less into the price index than an industry-wide cost
reduction. However, the product-specific pass-on rate is now  as the product’s
market share increases.



























This rather complicated formula has again the property that product-specific pass-on
is only a fraction of industry-wide pass-on. A cost reduction for a single product is
thus passed on by less than an industry-wide cost reduction. However, in contrast to
the monopoly case, there is now no longer a simple relationship between the product’s
market share and the degree of pass-on. To gain some further insights we computed
firm-specific pass-on for alternative values of the firm’s market share and alternative
numbers of competing firms. We assume the competing firms are all identical (so that
they have an equal market share. The results of the computations are given in the
Table 4. below.
Table 4. Firm-specific absolute pass-on with symmetric competitors
Number of competing firms
Market
share 1 2 3 4 5 1000
0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.100 0.197 0.138 0.120 0.111 0.107 0.090
0.200 0.287 0.222 0.200 0.189 0.183 0.160
0.300 0.327 0.271 0.250 0.240 0.234 0.210
0.400 '( '$) '$(* 0.267 0.262 0.240
0.500 0.325 0.292 0.279 '$($ '$*+ '$,'
0.600 0.293 0.271 0.262 0.257 0.254 0.24060
0.700 0.243 0.230 0.224 0.221 0.219 0.210
0.800 0.176 0.170 0.167 0.166 0.165 0.160
0.900 0.095 0.093 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.090
0.999 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Reading Table 4 row by row, one can see that a firm with a given market share passes
on less as the number of competing firms increases. Intuitively, when there are a large
number of firms, competition between these firms is strong and market power is
weak, so that they do not respond to price changes initiated by one firm. Reading the
Table column by column, one can see the role of the market share of the firm
experiencing the cost reduction. Pass-on is very limited when the market share of the
firm is either very small or very large. The case of no pass-on under a very small
market share corresponds to the case of a price taking firm as under perfect
competition (section 3.2.3.1). Intermediate market shares lead to the greatest pass-on.
(
*4 In a product-differentiated industry, product-specific pass-
on is less than industry wide pass-on, both under monopoly as under oligopoly.
Market share matters in assessing the magnitude of firm-specific pass-on
under product differentiation. The logit model indicates that intermediate
levels of market shares yield the greatest product-specific pass-on.
We note that the specific results depend on the assumption of the logit model, which
implies that firms have a tendency to adjust their markups when cost changes. In other
models, such as the linear demand model or the CES model, it may be expected that
higher levels of firm-specific pass-on would obtain. A robust finding would
nevertheless be that firm-specific pass-on would be less than industry wide pass-on.
Also, it should be clear that the market share of the firm experiencing a cost reduction
is a key determinant of firm-specific pass-on; the logit example suggests that pass-on
is largest when the firm has an intermediate market share.
It is useful to compare this preliminary analysis on differentiated goods industries with
the theoretical results obtained by Feenstra et al. (1996). They study exchange rate
pass-through, which is equivalent to pass-on of cost changes. In particular, they
investigate the role of the market share of the exporting firms who experience the
exchange rate shock (the cost change). We stress that their results are not directly
comparable to ours: they treat each individual exporting firm as small and look at the
role of the total market share of all exporting firms. They find that under some modest
assumptions pass-through is equal to one half if the exporting firm has a very small
market share. As the market share of the exporting firm increases, pass-through may
initially decrease or increase; yet as the market share becomes very large, pass-through
starts to increase and ultimately becomes complete. These results on the role of
market share are not necessarily inconsistent with ours. Indeed, as the market share of
the exporting firms increases in Feenstra et al.’s model, the exchange rate (or cost)
change becomes more like an industry-wide cost change. Their conclusion that pass-
on is complete as the market share of the exporting firms becomes very large is then
similar to our Observation 3.7 regarding complete pass-on of an industry-wide cost
shock.61
3.2.4 Summary
This section has reviewed the theoretical determinants of pass-on of cost savings. It is
important to bear in mind that one may measure either absolute pass-on or relative
pass-on (the pass-on elasticity). We begin by looking at pass-on of industry wide cost
savings, i.e. cost savings realized by all firms in the industry. Under perfect
competition, the price elasticity of demand and the shape of the marginal cost curve
are the main determinants. As consumers become more price inelastic, and as the
supply curve becomes more elastic (little capacity constraints), pass-on of industry
wide cost savings will be more complete. If supply is perfectly elastic (no capacity
constraints), pass-on of industry-wide cost savings is complete under perfect
competition. The picture is different under monopoly or oligopoly with market power.
In this case, pass-on of industry wide cost savings may be incomplete even if supply is
perfectly elastic. The reason is that firms charge markups, which depend on the price
elasticity of consumer demand. In the “typical” case, consumers become more price
sensitive as the price increases. If this is the case, then firms will absorb cost changes
by adjusting their markups and pass-on will be incomplete. This is especially true in
the monopoly case. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that even in the monopoly case
(or the dominant firm case) firms pass on at least part of the cost savings onto
consumers. As the number of firms increases, pass-on of industry wide cost savings
generally becomes more complete.
This section finally emphasized the importance of distinguishing between industry-
wide and firm-specific pass-on. An understanding of firm-specific pass-on is
especially relevant in the context of mergers, since it are typically only the merging
firms who benefit from any cost reduction. Our analysis shows that firm-specific pass-
on is generally less than industry wide pass-on. For example, when firms are identical,
firm-specific pass-on is equal to industry-wide pass-on divided by the number of firms
in the industry. Hence the more firms there are, the lower is the degree of firm-
specific pass-on. When firms are not identical, no general results on firm-specific
pass-on are available. Nevertheless, it is clear that the market share of the firm
realizing the cost reduction matters. On the one hand, a high market share of the cost-
reducing firm makes the cost saving close to an industry-wide cost saving and thus
makes pass-on more complete. On the other hand, a high market share also means a
lot of market power, which may provide an incentive to pass on cost changes
incompletely. The results of these forces is that pass-on in an industry is typically the
largest for firms with intermediate market share, i.e. not the very small firms but also
not the dominant firms.
 %"-
We do not aim at this point to provide a complete review of the empirical results on
pass-on. Instead, we consider some of the most important recent contributions in more
detail. This will give the opportunity to explain strengths and weaknesses of alterative
approaches in measuring pass-on. Nevertheless, we will also discuss the specific
empirical results obtained in various papers. This should be useful to put further
results in perspective.
The empirical literature on pass-on of cost savings from mergers is, to our knowledge,
virtually non-existent. It is thus necessary to draw lessons from empirical work on
pass-on of cost changes that are triggered by other events than mergers. Various fields62
in economics have, in fact, been concerned with quantifying pass-on. First, there is a
large literature in International Economics on exchange-rate pass-through. This deals
with the question whether and to which extent exporting firms pass-through exchange
rate fluctuations in consumer prices. Related to the exchange rate pass-through
literature is the pricing to market literature (Krugman, 1987). The focus is different in
that the implications of incomplete exchange rate pass-through on local prices are
investigated when exporting firms sell to different markets. Also in International
Economics, there has been research on the impact of tariffs on consumer prices.
Second, in Public Economics, there has been a great amount of research on tax
incidence. A central question here is which agents are most affected by a tax policy,
taking into account behavioural responses. The literature relevant for our purposes
deals with the incidence of excise taxes. It asks how consumer prices respond to
changes in excise taxes. Third, in various specialized applied areas in Economics,
there has been considerable interest in the transmission of intermediate goods prices
into the prices for final goods. For example, in Agricultural Economics, empirical
research has looked at the price transmission of intermediate food products, such as
cacao, coffee beans, sugar, etc…; in Energy Economics empirical research considers
the transmission of price fluctuations for crude oil, etc.
Exchange rates, tariffs, excise taxes and intermediate goods prices have in common
the important properties that they affect the marginal costs of firms, often fluctuate
considerably and can be well observed.
54 They thus have the potential to provide
useful information on the pass-on of cost changes onto consumer prices. Nevertheless,
special care has been taken when drawing inferences. First, it is essential to know
whether the measured cost changes are specific to some firms only, or whether they
apply to all firms in an industry. In the previous section we emphasised that firm-
specific pass-on may differ significantly from industry-wide pass-on. Changes in
excise taxes or intermediate goods prices typically affect the costs of all firms in the
industry. Exchange rate changes, in contrast, only affect the costs of the foreign firms,
leaving the costs of the domestic firms constant.
55 Second, one has to know whether
the measured cost change applies to the whole product, or only to part of it. Excise
taxes apply to the full product. An exchange rate fluctuation affects the full marginal
cost incurred in the exporter’s country, yet have no impact on local distribution or
other costs of services. Intermediate goods typically constitute only a fraction of the
marginal costs. Third, one should be sure whether one is measuring short run or long
run effects of cost changes on consumer prices. If short-run effects are considerably
lower than long-term effects, and if adjustment goes quickly, then results on short-run
effects may be highly misleading.
                                                          
54 Feenstra (1989) goes into a detailed theoretical and empirical investigation of the “symmetry”
hypothesis, which states that exchange rate fluctuations, tariff and factor prices should hve the same
impact on consumer prices.
55 This would at least be the case in the short run The long-run, exchange rates may also affect the costs
of the domestic firms, because exchange rate changes affect the prices of inputs used by the domestic
firms.63
3.3.1 Evidence on industry-wide pass-on
3.3.1.1 Excise taxes and pass-on
Several papers have looked at the pass-on of industry wide cost changes by looking at
the relationship between excise taxes and consumer prices. A first study in this spirit
is by Sumner (1981). He regresses the price for cigarettes in 47 states of the U.S.
during 1954-78 on the per unit excise tax and some control variables. The regression
thus takes the following form:
W W W W      + + + = γ β α (8)
where Pt is the consumer price for observation t, Tt is the per unit excise tax, and Wt
are control variables. Of our immediate interest is the coefficient β . Sumner
interpreted this coefficient also as a measure of the price to marginal cost markup.
This interpretation was criticized by Bulow and Pfleiferer (1983) and Sullivan (1985)
since it relies on strong functional form assumptions. We instead interpret the
parameter simply as a reduced form parameter measuring the extent to which excise
taxes are passed on into the consumer price. More precisely, since the variables are
expressed in levels, the parameter β  measures the pass-on of a unit cost (tax) change
on the unit price change. This differs from the pass-on elasticity, which measures
pass-on in percentage terms rather than in absolute levels.
Sumner finds a precise estimate of β  of 1.074 (with a standard error of 0.013). This
means that an increase in the excise tax by, say, 10 cents per unit leads to an increase
in the price for cigarettes of 10.74 cents. (Or, since the analysis uses a panel, the price
in a state with a 10 cents higher excise tax will be 10.74 cents higher.) Pass-on in
absolute terms is thus greater than one. This implies that one can reject the hypothesis
of perfect competition under constant marginal cost. To compute the pass-on
elasticity, referring to pass-on in percentage terms, one would need to divide the
number 1.074 by the price/marginal cost ratio. This number is not known, but it is
generally greater than one. It is thus possible that the pass-on in percentage terms is
incomplete.
Sullivan (1985) also estimates a reduced form version of (8). He allows for a more
flexible specification, since he adds a quadratic term for the excise tax:
56
W W W W W       + + − + + = γ β β α
2
2 1 ) (
where  is the average tax rate. The effect of an increase in the excise tax by one unit
on the consumer price is thus  ) ( 2 2 1  W − + β β . Sullivan obtains a parameter estimate
of β 1 equal to 1.089 (standard error of 0.26) and an estimate of β 2 equal to 0.0090
(standard error of 0.0035). For example, if the tax in one state is 10 cents higher than
the average, the price in that state will be higher by the amount of 10 cents times
1.089+2*0.009=1.107, so it will be 11.07 cents higher. In contrast, if the tax rate is 10
cents lower than the average, then the price will be 10.71 cents lower. Pass-on is thus
found to be asymmetric, yet of the same order of magnitude as in Sumner (1981).
57
                                                          
56 He also considers a reduced form demand equation to draw inferences on market power.
57 See also the preceding studies by Barzel (1976), Johnson (1978), Harris (1983), Wohlegant and
Sumner (1985), Sumner and Ward (1981).64
Barnet, Keeler and Hu (1995) estimate a structural model of oligopoly to assess the
pass-on (“incidence”) of excise taxes. This approach allows them to estimate the cost
parameters and demand parameters that potentially explain pass-on. The advantage of
this approach is thus that is can unravel the determinants of pass-on. A main
disadvantage is that the results are more dependent on the functional form
assumptions. Their estimates show that the price elasticity of demand is equal to 0.71,
implying that a price increase by 1 percent leads to a demand reduction of 0.71
percent. They also find that manufacturers are subject to increasing returns to scale,
and that conduct is consistent with Cournot oligopoly behaviour, indicating a
moderate degree of market power. They use their e-parameter estimates to simulate
the effects of a 1 cent increase in the excise tax, holding all other variables constant.
They find that such an increase leads to an increase in the consumer price in the range
of 0.9-1.0 depending on whether it concerns a federal or a state tax increase. This
result is due to a combination of two factors. First, marginal costs are declining which
induces overshifting of the taxes into consumer prices. Second, firms have market
power and adjust their markups downward when taxes increase (and upward when
they decrease).
In a structural model of the automobile industry, Verboven (1998) considers the
effects of the differential taxation on gasoline and diesel cars on the manufacturers
pricing decisions. Verboven shows that the premium charged for diesel cars can be
largely explained by higher markups and less so by higher marginal costs for
producing diesel cars. Firms thus exercise significant market power on their premium
models (though not necessarily on their base models). Simulations on the effects of
increasing the tax differential between gasoline and diesel cars show that firms adjust
their markups significantly. In other words, although marginal costs are assumed
constant, pass-on is small because markup adjustment.
In sum, the studies on cigarette excise taxes show that pass-on of industry-wide cost
changes (excise taxes) in the cigarette industry is more than complete in absolute
terms. It is asymmetric in that an increase in costs is passed on more than a decrease.
It is not possible to draw strong conclusions on pass-on in percentage terms, i.e. the
pass-on elasticity. All we can say is that the pass-on elasticity has to be adjusted by the
price/marginal cost ratio; it will thus be smaller than the reported range of 1.07-1.09.
Nevertheless, it seems that pass-on is rather large in the cigarette industry, which is
confirmed by the structural analysis by Barnett et al. The results follow the moderate
amount of market power and the possible presence of increasing returns to scale
(declining marginal costs). In contrast, in the automobile market, the study by
Verboven indicates that pass-on of cost changes is rather limited, at least regarding
differential costs between gasoline and diesel cars. This follows from the significant
market power firms have regarding the pricing of their premium models.
3.3.1.2 Intermediate goods prices and pass-on
Several papers have looked at how the price for a final consumer good responds to the
movements in the price of a single intermediate good, e.g. crude oil in Energy
Economics, or unrefined sugar in Agricultural Economics. For simplicity, we assume
in the following discussion that the intermediate good is used in a fixed proportion to
the other inputs. This means that producing one unit of the final consumption good
always requires the use of x units of the intermediate good, where x is called the65
transformation rate. In contrast to an excise tax, a movement in the price of an
intermediate good only affects a fraction of the marginal cost. As explained in section
3.2.2.3, to know the full pass-on elasticity, one needs to adjust the pass-on elasticity
by the cost share of the intermediate good. Without such an adjustment, one could
falsely conclude that pass-on is low, whereas in fact only the cost share of the
intermediate good is low. To illustrate, in unpublished results we estimated the
following pass-on regression relating the price of roasted coffee on the price of its
main intermediate input, coffee beans:
W W W W     + + + = γ β α
where pt, mt and wt refer to the consumer price of roasted coffee, the price of the
intermediate good, coffee beans, and control variables (e.g. time and country
dummies). All variables are now in lower case letters, to denote that they are
expressed in logarithms. The coefficient β  can then be interpreted as a pass-on
elasticity, rather than measuring pass-on in absolute levels. Regression results based
on either quarterly or annual data for a set of 15 OECD countries since 1970 show that
the pass-on elasticity varies between 0.5 and 0.7, depending on the country. This
should not, however, be seen as evidence that pass-on of marginal cost savings is
incomplete. One rather has to ask what is the share of coffee beans is in the full
marginal cost. Taking into account that labour and packaging costs also affect the
marginal costs, most industry experts agree that coffee beans constitute slightly more
than 60 percent of the marginal costs. If this is true, then one could conclude from the
estimates that the pass-on elasticity for industry-wide cost savings is close to one in
the coffee markets of OECD countries.
Several studies have looked at pass-on of intermediate goods price fluctuations in
levels, rather than in percent.
W W W W     + + + = γ β α (9)
This is similar to the experiments of Sumner and Sullivan on the pass-on of excise
taxes in levels. There is, however, one important difference. An excise tax directly
translates into a marginal cost. An intermediate goods price needs to be multiplied by
its transformation rate to measure the impact on marginal cost. For example, for the
production of 1 kg roasted coffee 1.2 kg of coffee beans is required, so the
transformation rate is 1.2.
58 To correctly assess whether pass-on in levels is complete
one thus has to compare the estimate of β  to the transformation rate (if this is known).
Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) consider a version of regression (9) to assess
the effect of fluctuations in crude oil prices on gasoline prices. They propose a lag
adjustment specification, which distinguishes between short-run and long-run
responses to fluctuations in crude oil prices. Our interest is mainly in the long-run
response. They find that that an increase in the crude oil price by 1 cent leads to an
increase in consumer prices by 0.55 cent in the first two weeks, and a further increase
of 0.12 cent in the next two weeks; after 6 weeks pass-on is about 0.71 cents without
any further effects at later points in time. Pass-on is asymmetric: decreases in the
crude oil prices are passed on to consumers more slowly, but eventually at the same
rate. A decrease in the crude oil price by 1 cent has no immediate effect; it leads to a
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amount of 20 percent.66
0.29 cent price reduction after 4 weeks, a 0.43 cent price reduction after 6 weeks and a
0.70 cent price reduction only after 8 weeks. Overall, in the long run (after 10 weeks)
pass-on is less than one, about 0.81 cent. This is despite the fact that they are looking
at pass-on in levels and not in percentage terms, so that one cannot use the fact that
crude oil is only one component of the marginal cost of producing gasoline.
Furthermore, the transformation rate of crude oil into gasoline is presumably greater
than one. One explanation for the incomplete pass-on is that the marginal cost curve is
upward-sloping (capacity constraints). As explained in the theoretical section, a
reduction in price following a crude oil price decrease would lead to greater demand.
To accommodate this demand, a larger production is needed. This could lead to a
partially offsetting increase in cost, explaining incomplete pass-on. An alternative
explanation would be that consumers become more price sensitive as prices increase
(increasing price elasticity of demand). If this is so, then it is optimal to pass-on cost
changes incompletely by adjusting markups.
In a related model von Cramon-Taubadel (1997) considers the transmission of
producer prices for pork into the wholesale prices in Northern Germany. He also
distinguishes between short term and long-term adjustments. Pass-on turns out to be
complete in the long run: over a period of about 10 weeks. the absolute margin
between the producer and the wholesale price remains constant at 1.30 DM/kg. In the
short run, however, pass-on is found to be incomplete: a unit increase in the producers
price leads to an increase in 0.58 units during the first week. Furthermore, it turns out
that the adjustment process is asymmetric. The response to an increase in the producer
price for pork is significantly faster than the response to a decrease. The most relevant
message for our purposes is that pass-on of producer price into whole prices is
complete in the long-run, i.e. when considering a period of at least 10 weeks. This
result is confirmed in various other studies relating producer to wholesale prices in
agricultural economics, see e.g. Kinnucan and Forker (1987) for dairy product price
transmission or Pick, Karrenbrock and Carman (1990) for the citrus market.
Bettendorf and Verboven (1999) consider the price transmission for coffee beans into
consumer prices for roasted coffee. In contrast to the other studies on price
transmission in agricultural products, they consider a structural model to explain the
causes underlying price transmission. They find that the rather weak relationship
between bean and consumer prices follows largely from the fact that coffee beans are
only a fraction of marginal costs. Nevertheless, they also show that markup
adjustment is present, although it has only a modest importance since market power is
limited. Genesove and Mullin (1997) consider a structural model of price setting for
refined sugar. Although they do not explicitly consider the pass-on question, their
estimation results imply similar results on pass-on as those obtained by Bettendorf and
Verboven.
From the analysis of price transmission of intermediate goods prices common to all
firms in the industry, we conclude that pass-on in the long run is relatively large, and
in many cases complete. In the short-run pass-on may be less complete, yet adjustment
takes place relatively quickly, within a period of 10 weeks for the studies we
reviewed. Structural studies suggest that the large degree of pass-on follows from the
relatively low degree of market power in the industries considered.67
3.3.2 Evidence on pass-on by a fraction of the firms
3.3.2.1 Exchange rate pass-through in general
The large empirical literature on exchange rate pass-through also provides interesting
evidence on pass-on of cost savings. This literature aims to measure by how much
foreign firms pass on exchange rate fluctuations into the import price charged to local
consumers. Understanding exchange rate pass-through is very relevant for our
purposes, since a fluctuation in the exchange rate may be viewed as a change in the
marginal costs of the foreign firm. Note that an exchange rate fluctuation only affects
the cost position of the foreign firms. An exchange rate fluctuation should thus no
longer be viewed as an industry-wide cost shock in contrast to the above discussed
studies considering the effects of taxes and fluctuations in intermediate goods prices.
To analyse exchange rate pass-through, a common approach has been to regress the
local consumer price to the exchange rate of the foreign firm, after controlling for
other variables:
W W W W   	  + + + = γ β α (10)
In this specification, pt is the logarithm of the consumer price at time 
, expressed in
the local currency of the importing country. The variable et is the logarithm of the
exchange rate, measured in units of the local currency per unit of the foreign firm’s
currency. An increase (decrease) in et thus means an appreciation (depreciation) of the
foreign firm’s currency relative to the currency of the importing country. It may
equivalently be viewed as an increase (decrease) in the marginal cost of the foreign





























































foreign firm would increase its price by 10 percent whenever its currency appreciates
by 10 percent; and vice versa for a currency depreciation. In this case, we have
complete exchange rate pass-through or full pass on of changes in marginal costs.
The empirical literature has considered various alternative forms for regression (10).
One alternative is to estimate the regression in first differences of the included
variables:
W W W W   	  + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ γ β α
This regresses the change in local consumer prices on the change in the value of the
foreign firm’s currency and a change in the control variables.
More recently, authors have estimated “error correction” versions of the model. Such
regressions take into account that responses to exchange rate fluctuations may not
necessarily be instantaneous. One can then distinguish between exchange rate pass-
through in the short term and in the long term. Because of adjustment costs, one may68
expect exchange rate pass-through to be larger in the long term. One simple version of
an error correction model is:




W   	   	  + − − − + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ γ β α ϕ γ β
The parameters β
S and γ
S measure short term responses of prices, whereas β  and γ
measure the long term responses.
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Among the most interesting studies in the spirit of the above regressions are the
contributions by Kreinin (1977), Woo (1984), Hooper and Mann (1989), Feenstra
(1989) and Athukorala and Menon (1994). All studies estimate some form of the
above regressions, to find out the degree of exchange rate pass-through, after
controlling for other factors.
Kreinin (1977) considers exchange rate pass-through to 8 countries, using detailed
commodity data. He estimates that exchange rate pass-through by foreign firms to
U.S. import prices is 50 percent. In comparison, pass-through by foreign firms to
import prices is 60 percent in Germany, 70 percent in Japan, 90 percent in Canada and
Belgium, and 100 percent in Italy. One interpretation of the differences across the
importing countries (which is also advanced by Kreinin) relates to differences in the
size of the countries. For a large country like the U.S., the market share of the foreign
firms is likely to be small. An exchange rate shock thus only affects the marginal costs
of a relatively small fraction of the firms. In contrast, foreign firms are likely to have a
significant market share in smaller countries like Canada, Belgium or Italy. An
exchange rate shock then affects the marginal costs of a larger fraction of firms. In an
extreme case, when there are only foreign firms, an exchange rate fluctuation would
affect the marginal cost of all the firms in the market, so that one may speak of an
“industry-wide cost change”. The fact that pass-on is smaller into the U.S. than into
Belgium, Canada or Italy, is thus consistent with the hypothesis that firm-specific
pass-on is smaller than industry-wide pass-on.
In our theoretical analysis we discussed that incomplete pass-on of cost changes can
be explained by either markup adjustment, or by adjustments in marginal costs if these
are not constant. Since Kreinin does not include direct controls for marginal cost
changes, one cannot determine whether the observed incomplete pass-through can be
explained by markup or marginal cost adjustment. Woo (1984) studies exchange rate
pass-through by foreign firms exporting to the U.S. He estimates pass-on to be
between 40 and 75 percent, in line with the results by Kreinin. He attributes the
incomplete pass-through fully to markup adjustments, since he controls for changes in
the marginal costs.
Hooper and Mann (1989) control for cost changes more completely, by accounting for
foreign labour and materials costs, foreign capacity and U.S. domestic costs. They
also try to distinguish between long run and short run effects using an error correction
approach. They find that the long run exchange rate pass-through elasticity by foreign
firms in the U.S. is 60 percent. Because they control for costs, they interpret this
incomplete exchange rate pass-through as markup adjustment. Interestingly, they also
impose the symmetry restriction. The symmetry restriction says that a change in all
factor prices (labour, materials) by, say, 10 percent, should have the same effect on
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local consumer prices as a change in the exchange rate of the foreign firm by 10
percent. Intuitively, this is because a change in  factor prices has the same effect on
marginal costs as a change in the exchange rate, and should therefore also lead to the
same degree of pass-on. They find that imposing the symmetry restriction does not
affect the estimated pass-on elasticity of 60 percent.
Feenstra (1989) investigates the symmetry restriction further. He tests whether a
change in all factor prices has the same effect on local consumer prices as a change in
the exchange rate and as an import tariff. Intuitively, also an import tariff has the same
effect on marginal costs, and should therefore have a symmetric effect on local
consumer prices. In contrast to the previous studies, Feenstra considers disaggregated
data on individual industries. The symmetry hypothesis is tested for Japanese firms
selling into three U.S. markets: trucks, cars and heavy cycles. With respect to
exchange rate changes, Feenstra finds a pass-on elasticity between 0.52 and 0.63 for
trucks, between 0.7 and 0.8 for cars and between 0.7 and 1.1 for heavy cycles. With
respect to tariffs, the pass-on elasticity is 0.57 for trucks, and between 0.95 and 1.39
for heavy motor cycles (no tariffs on cars). Feenstra finds statistical support for the
symmetry hypothesis. Imposing the symmetry hypothesis
60, Feenstra obtains estimates
of the pass-on elasticities of 0.58 for trucks, 0.73 for cars and between 0.97 and 1.27
for heavy cycles. It is instructive to consider the interpretation provided by Feenstra
for his differential findings regarding the pass-on elasticity with respect to tariffs. For
trucks, the tariffs only applied to Japanese models produced in Japan, with a relatively
small  market shares. In contrast, for heavy cycles, the tariff also applied to U.S. based
production by the Japanese companies. Furthermore, the Japanese firms have a
modest market share in the U.S. truck market, and a strong market share in heavy
cycles, the only U.S. competitor being Harley-Davidson. Once again, this indicates
that it is important to distinguish between firm-level and industry-wide pass-on.
Another study that looks at more disaggregate data is by Athukorala and Menon
(1994). They consider exchange rate pass-through in various sectors, in particular
textiles, chemicals, metal products, general machinery, electrical machinery, and
transport equipment. They also take into account that an exchange rate fluctuation
affects the marginal costs because inputs need to be imported at a different cost to the
exchange rate change. The following table shows the pass-on coefficients for the














Metal products 10.82 0.678
General machinery 21.13 0.461
                                                          
60 Feenstra also imposes a homogeneity restriction.
61 Athukorala and Menon prefer to call these coefficients pricing to market coefficients, since they take
out exchange rate effects stemming from changed factor prices for imported inputs. For our purposes,
the exchange rate pass-through coefficient that includes factor price effects is not relevant. The
differences between both measures are generally small.70
Electrical machinery 15.95 0.549
Transport equipment 34.23 0.605
Miscellaneous products 9.03 0.566
Total Manufacturers 100.00 0.788
Source: From Table 2 of Athukorala and Menon (1994).
First, Athukorala and Menon note that the aggregate pass-on elasticity of 0.788 is
larger than the average pass-on elasticity across the industries, which is 0.47. From
this they suggest that there is an upward bias in the pass-on elasticity due to
aggregation. Second, going to individual sectors, they argue that the low pass-on
elasticity for textiles, compared to the other sectors, is due to the limited market power
of the Japanese firms in the textile industry.
3.3.2.2 Exchange rate pass-through due to markup adjustment
A new approach to estimating incomplete exchange rate pass-through was proposed
by Knetter (1989). He criticises the previous approaches because they only partially
control for cost changes that coincide with the exchange rate fluctuation. According to
Knetter, the previous approaches cannot very well identify whether pass-on is
incomplete because of markup adjustment, or because of cost changes that coincide
with the exchange rate change. Consider for example an exchange rate appreciation of
a foreign firm’s currency by 10 percent. This has the direct effect to make the firm less
competitive, similar to an increase in its marginal cost by 10 percent. However, two
additional cost effects may occur. First, an appreciation makes the imported inputs
cheaper, so that marginal cost decreases. Failure to account for this would lead to an
estimate for the pass-on elasticity that is biased downward. This was in fact shown to
be the case by Athukorala and Menon (1994). Second, if an appreciation is at least
partly passed on to consumers by raising import prices, then demand decreases. Only
if marginal costs are flat this has no further implications for costs. If, however,
marginal costs are upward sloping, then the demand reduction also means a reduction
in marginal costs, which partly compensates for the initial cost reduction.
To measure costs accurately, Knetter proposes to consider exchange rate pass-through
behaviour by an exporting firm selling into multiple local markets, as in the following
regression:
LW LW LW L W L LW   	   + + + + = γ β α
This regression model differs from the regression (10) in that now data are used for
multiple local markets, as indicated by the additional subscript i. One thus uses a
panel data set of countries and years. The term α i is a fixed market effect to control for
the fact that prices in one country may be persistently higher. The marginal cost ct is
unobserved, but it is assumed that it is common across all local destination markets to
which the firm exports. Marston considered a two-country version of this model, and
used the price in the country of production as a measure for the marginal costs in the
local destination market. Knetter proposes to estimate the model for multiple local
markets, and estimate the common cost effects ct as a fixed effect using time
dummies. The regression model then is:71
LW LW LW L W L LW   	  + + + + = γ β α α
or in first differences:
LW LW LW L W LW   	  + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ γ β α














 m may be interpreted
as a pass-through coefficient, after holding marginal costs constant; it thus purely aims
to capture markup adjustment following exchange rate fluctuations. A coefficient for
m equal to 1 does thus not mean that exchange rate pass-through is complete; it only




 m equal to 0 means that markups are fully adjusted after an exchange
rate movement.
The advantage of the panel data approach proposed by Knetter is thus that it is
possible to identify one key component of pass-on: the possibility that firms adjust
their markups.
62 Without such an identification, it is not clear whether one should
explain incomplete pass-on by markup adjustment or by the presence of an upward
sloping marginal cost curve.
Knetter (1993) applies his approach to study a rather large set of import markets and
various industries. Knetter thus also aims to bring a synthesis of the existing empirical
evidence using his methodology. One may summarize his findings as follows. First,
there is a tendency by firms to pass-on incompletely by adjusting markups in response
to exchange rate fluctuations. This tendency is stronger for Japanese, German and
U.K. firms than for U.S. firms, with pass-on elasticities of respectively 0.52, 0.64,
0.64 and 1. Second, incomplete pass-through stemming from markup adjustment
depends on the specific industry. For example, consider industries that have a
common classification across all countries. Pass-on is complete for bourbon, 84
percent for titanium dioxide, 40 percent for synthetic dyes and film, 25 percent for
paper, and absent for aluminium foil. One can conclude from this work that an
important source of incomplete pass-on of cost savings is in fact markup adjustment.
Thus even an industry with constant marginal costs, it is possible that firms will pass
on cost changes incompletely into consumer prices. The exact magnitude will,
however, depend on the specific industry. In a subsequent paper, using data on the
same industries, Knetter (1994) tests whether pass-on is asymmetric, i.e. different for
exchange rate appreciation than depreciation. He does not find evidence on this
possibility.
In subsequent work, Gagnon and Knetter aim to distinguish between short-term and
long-term adjustments of markups in response to exchange rate changes, following an
error correction approach.
63 In a simple form, one may write the error correction
model as:
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62 Marston provides an early approach in the spirit of Knetter. He controls for cost changes by looking
at the ratio of the local import price to the foreign export price.
63If the variables are non-stationary, then significant parameter estimates may be a consequence of
spurious correlation. One then has to test whether there is a co-integrating relationship between the
variables. If so, one can sensibly apply an error correction model to distinguish between a short-run and
long run relationship.72
They apply their analysis using data on Japanese, German and U.S. automobile
exporters, in three engine size categories (less than 1 liter, 1-2 liter, and greater than 2
liter). They find that pass-on due to markup adjustment is especially low in the short
run due to adjustment costs (price rigidities). In the long run, pass-on tends to be more
complete, especially by U.S. firms. Japanese firms have pass-on elasticities in the
range of 0.09-0.12, meaning that they tend to pass-on only about 9 to 12 percent of an
exchange rate fluctuation into final consumer prices. This is true for all three engine
size categories, and most local import markets. German firms tend to pass-on more. In
the low and medium size engine categories, pass-on is usually 50 percent or more. In
the large size engine category, pass-on is close to being complete, with even
overshooting to the import markets of France and Sweden. U.S. firms show an even
larger tendency to pass-on exchange rate movements, with elasticities ranging
between 0.80 and 1.2. Gagnon and Knetter interpret the different results regarding the
three source firms, based on the type of demand they face. Japanese exporters attract
only few consumers with high reservation prices (high willingness to pay). This
implies that an increase in the local price to compensate for a Yen appreciation makes
most consumers more price sensitive (higher price elasticity). This forces Japanese
firms to adjust their markup. German and U.S. exporters are more active in niche
markets with few substitutes and many consumers with high reservation prices. They
can more easily raise prices after an appreciation without making consumers more
price sensitive.
Gosh and Wolf (1994) also emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the
short and the long run. They look at weekly prices set for the magazine the Economist.
If one does not make a distinction between the short and the long run, then one may
obtain the “spurious” result that pass-on is close to zero, since adjusting to new
conditions takes time.
Feenstra, Gagnon and Knetter (1996) bridge the gap between empirical studies that
consider industry-wide pass-on (section 3.3.1) and studies that consider fraction by
only a fraction of (exporting) firms. In particular, they consider the role of the market
share of the foreign firms in determining pass-on in the long run, using data on the
automobile industry. They find that exporting firms with a very small market share
pass on about 70 percent of an exchange rate fluctuation by adjusting markups. As
market share of the exporting firms increases, the pass-on elasticity decreases, to reach
a minimum of about 0.30 when the market share is about 40 percent. When the market
share increases beyond 40 percent the pass-on elasticity increases and becomes
roughly complete when the exporting firms have 100 percent of the market. These
findings are very intuitive and consistent with the theory on pass-on of cost changes. If
the market share of the exporting firms is 100 percent, then the exchange rate
fluctuation is essentially an industry-wide cost shock. One may then expect complete
pass-on if the marginal cost curve is flat, and if firms act rather competitively. In
contrast, if the market share of the exporting firms is small, then an exchange rate
fluctuation corresponds more to a firm-specific cost shock.
64 In this case, pass-on is
expected to be smaller.
                                                          
64 Note however that even when the exporting firms have a small market share, the exchange rate
fluctuation cannot be viewed as a firm-specific cost shock, since there may still be several competing
exporting firms.73
Schembri (1989) analyses pass-on of exchange rate fluctuations for a Canadian export
industry (using confidential data) selling an intermediate good to the U.S. and Canada.
In contrast to the previous studies on exchange rate pass-through, Schembri explicitly
estimates the cost and demand parameters of the export industry, from which the pass-
on elasticity can then be computed using formulas similar to the ones we provided in
section 3.2. This approach is feasible because there are more data than simply prices
and exchange rates. Good cost data (factor prices and factor demands) and demand
data (sales) are also available. Schembri reports that the pass-on elasticity by the
Canadian export industry to the U.S. is approximately 0.85. This incomplete pass-on
is partly due to the fact that marginal costs are not flat but increasing, and partly
because of markup adjustment. Unfortunately, we do not know what is the market
share of the Canadian export industry in the U.S. market.
In a study of the U.S. automobile market, Goldberg (1995) estimates a model with
product differentiation, the nested logit model, which classifies the market in various
segments, according to class and country of origin. Using the estimated demand and
cost parameters, Goldberg simulates the pass-on of exchange rate fluctuations into
consumer prices for various exporting firms selling into the U.S. She computes
exchange rate pass-through for Japanese and German firms, following both
appreciations and depreciations. She distinguishes between the time when the
Japanese firms where capacity constrained due to import quotas, and the time when
they were unconstrained. The following summarizes the results:
Table. Pass-on by Japanese and German firms, with and without quota constraints
Without Japanese quota With Japanese quota
$ appr. $ depr. $ appr. $ depr.
Jap. Subcompact .155 .250 .015 .01
Jap. Compact .18 .30 .010 .02
Jap. Trucks .195 .245 .235 .255
Ger. Intermediate .700 1.21 .600 1.20
Ger. Luxury .755 1.01 .551 1.11
Ger. Sports .65 .805 .60 1.06
The first finding from this table is that Japanese firms typically pass-on a small
amount, and considerably less than German firms. This is consistent with e.g.
Knetter’s study who uses a different methodology. Japanese firms cannot raise (lower)
the prices in the U.S. in response to a cost increase (decrease) induced by the
exchange rate, and need to adjust markups. German firms have a higher ability to
adjust their prices, since they are able to adjust their markups by less. The second
finding is that pass-through is asymmetric: a cost decrease induced by an appreciation
of the dollar is passed on less than a cost increase induced by a depreciation of the
dollar. The third finding is that pass-on by the Japanese firms is much smaller when
they where subject to import quota constraints. This is very intuitive: an import quota
constraint means that Japanese firms are capacity constrained, i.e. they face a steeply74
increasing marginal cost curve. Under these conditions, any pass-on of cost changes
has to be small since supply cannot be adjusted to demand responses.
Goldberg and Verboven (1998) consider the role of exchange rates in the European
automobile market. They find evidence of incomplete pass-on, with pass-on
elasticities of about 0.5. They show that 1/3 of the incomplete pass-on can be
explained by markup adjustment. About 2/3 of the incomplete pass-on follows from
the fact that exporting firms also have important local costs (transportation,
distribution, marketing) which do not depend on the exchange rate fluctuations of the
exporting firms. Abstracting from the presence of local costs, one can thus say that
pass-on is relatively large, i.e. markups are only adjusted moderately. This is intuitive,
since an exchange rate fluctuation of, say, the pound, affects the competitive position
of all exporting firms selling into the U.K.
3.3.3 Firm specific pass-on
Studies that have looked at firm-specific pass-on of cost savings are scarce, especially
when compared to the relatively large literature on pass-on of industry-wide cost
changes (taxes, intermediate goods prices) and on pass-on of cost changes for a
fraction of firms (exchange rates). In the following, we discuss two articles, one
reduced form approach to assessing firms specific pass-on, and one structural
approach.
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Ashenfelter, Ashmore, Baker and McKerman (1998) propose a methodology to
estimate firm-specific pass-on as opposed to the pass-on of an industry-wide cost
change. They apply their approach to the Staples/Office Depot merger, a prominent
U.S. case in applying quantitative analysis.
66 Their analysis was a response to the
merging firms’ expert who had asserted, without providing empirical evidence, that
Staples reduced price by two-thirds of any cost reduction (see Baker, 1998). In
essence their approach amounts to regressing the price an individual firm charges on
both its own costs and the costs of other firms in the industry. Consider the following
simplified regression, using the notation we introduced in section 3.3.1:
W W W
)
W W      + + + + = γ β β α 2 1
where mt
F measures the cost of the individual firm, i.e. Staples; mt measures industry-
wide costs; and wt captures control variables. Industry-wide cost mt is approximated
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 2. Ashenfelter et al. also consider a restricted
                                                          
65 The residual demand literature, in particular, Baker and Bresnahan (1985); Spiller
(1987), has also offered results that are of related interest. A detailed discussion would
however lead us too far.
66 The case is not only known for its careful analysis of assessing pass-on. Also a detailed analysis on
market power effects was conducted. This was done by showing that Staples prices were significantly
lower in cities where Staples competed with Office Depot, than in non-competitive zones, where there
were no other superstore chains. This market power analysis indicated that prices could increase by 9
percent in markets where there was competition.75
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 2 is set equal to zero, to see what bias would result if one does
not control for industry-wide cost savings.
The data are provided by Staples and Office Depot. They are average monthly prices
and variables costs for 30 identical products sold during the years 1995 and 1996 in
various stores. The products were 17 pens, 7 paper items, 5 toner cartridges and 1
computer diskette. Store, product and time dummies are included to control for price









 2 is excluded, they find a pass-on elasticity of 0.571 (t-value












 2 is included they find a much
lower elasticity of 0.149 (t-value of 38). It implies that when Staples costs fall by 10
percent, without a change in the rivals costs, then Staples would lower price by
roughly only 1.5 percent. The difference between the two regression models
demonstrates that the bias from estimating firm-specific pass-on without controlling
for industry-wide cost changes can be quite large. Ashenfelter et al. also consider
whether there was any asymmetric pass-on of cost changes (i.e. increases versus
decreases), yet they did not find evidence on this.
Kadiyali (1997) studies strategic pricing and exchange rate pass-through in the U.S.
photographic film industry. There are two main competitors: Kodak and Fuji. A
structural econometric model is constructed, in which the demand and cost are directly
estimated. Kadiyali then simulates the effects of changes in the Yen/$ exchange rate
on the prices set by Fuji. Since there are only two firms, one can view his simulation
exercise as an analysis of firm-specific pass-on, in contrast to all the other articles on
pass-on reviewed above. Kadiyali finds that the firms-specific pass-through elasticity
for Fuji is relatively low. During the period 1980-1984, when it had an average market
share of 7.17 percent, the pass-on elasticity was 0.076. During the period 1985-1990,
when its average market share increased to 15.59 percent, the pass-on elasticity was
0.178.
3.3.4 Summary
In this section we have started by reviewing the rich empirical literature on tax
incidence, intermediate goods price transmission and exchange rate pass-through. The
empirical results vary sometimes substantially from sector to sector. Yet it is still
possible to make some empirical generalizations. It seems fair to say that the literature
on the effects of excise taxes and intermediate goods prices finds that pass-on is close
to 100 percent, at least when one considers a sufficiently large time horizon (10 weeks
or more). The literature on exchange rate pass-through tends to find incomplete pass-
on, of an order of magnitude of 60-70 percent. Part of this literature also relates the
extent of exchange rate pass-though to the market share of the exporting sector.
Finally, the scarce literature on firm-specific pass-on finds a relatively low degree of
pass-on, especially when the market share of the firms is small. The estimates are in
the range of 10-20 percent.
This evidence makes clear the empirical importance of considering firm-specific
rather than industry-wide pass-on. While industry-wide pass-on is more or less
complete, firm-specific pass-on may be substantially smaller. At the same time,
however, it is not sensible to draw strong general conclusions about the extent of firm-76
specific pass-on. The extent of firm-specific pass-on is likely to vary substantially
from merger to merger, and it seems unreasonable to aim for a general presumption on
the extent of firm-specific pass-on. In particular, there is a central role for market
share in explaining firm-specific pass-on. Low firm-specific pass-on may be due to
low market shares; yet in those cases the market power effects from mergers may also
be low.
Our empirical review does not only stress the importance of assessing pass-on on a
case-by-case basis; it has also introduced several possible methodologies for assessing
pass-on of cost savings. We hope our analysis makes it clear that the methodology
lends itself quite well for a fast implementation, as is required in merger cases. This is
especially true for the reduced form analysis, yet also structural approaches could be
feasible in some cases. The major potential constraint to assess pass-on in merger
cases is thus not necessarily in the application of sophisticated technical analysis.
Rather, it is important to make sure that the data required for the analysis are collected





In the previous chapter we have shown that the degree of pass-on depends on a variety
of factors. For example, one cannot make general claims that pass-on of cost savings
will be complete, unless one can be sure about certain market conditions (such as the
absence of capacity constraints). Similarly, one cannot make a general claim that a
monopolist (or a dominant firm) would not pass on any cost savings; to the contrary, it
is likely that even a monopolist will pass on at least part of its cost saving to
consumers. The extent of pass-on thus ultimately becomes an empirical matter. The
previous chapter showed that there are several general tendencies, confirming the
theory. An example is that that firm-specific pass-on is typically less than industry-
wide pass-on. Nevertheless, it is also clear that one cannot hope to have completely
general empirical conclusions on the extent of pass-on, applicable to any firm in any
industry. One is thus left with the task to empirically measure the extent of pass-on.
One approach would be to try to quantify all the relevant structural market conditions,
for example the price elasticity of demand, the extent of capacity constraints, etc…
While such an approach may be feasible in certain applications, it is often impractical,
especially in light of the time frame that competition agencies have to respect. The
goal of this chapter is to illustrate that there is a practical empirical alternative to
measure pass-on of cost savings in competition cases. The approach can be based on
data that are often readily available to the firms, and can be carried out within a
reasonable time using econometric techniques.
Using data for refrigerated juices, we will illustrate how one can practically estimate
the extent of pass-on using standard econometric techniques. The econometric
framework further elaborates on the framework of Ashenfelter et al. (1998). They
have used it to assess firm-specific pass-on in the Staples/Office Depot merger, as
discussed above. We show how the framework can be extended to also consider the
multiproduct nature of firms. Yet to estimate firm-specific pass-on, we would also
need data on competing firms.77
We begin by outlining the required data and the actual data in section 4.2. We next
discuss the econometric framework in section 4.1. Finally, we present and interpret







Whether one measures absolute pass-on or relative pass-on (i.e. the pass-on elasticity),
two key types of data are required: price data and cost data. The price data refer to the
price for the products sold by the merging firms. The cost data in principle refer to
marginal cost, though in practice variable costs may be a reasonable proxy.
In merger analysis, it is important to focus on firm-specific pass-on, rather than
industry wide pass-on, since cost efficiencies are typically only realized by the
merging firms. In the previous chapter it was shown that firm-specific pass-on is
typically lower than industry-wide pass-on. We also discussed there the framework of
Ashenfelter et al. to measure firm-specific pass-on. The required data for their
approach are price and cost data for several firms in the industry, for example the two
merging firms. We do not have this information. Instead, we show how one can easily
extend the Ashenfelter framework to account for the multiproduct nature of firms. We
also show that it is important to focus on the price level in the whole industry, rather
than on the prices of the individual products.
'	

In addition, as will be shown in section 4.2, it will be useful to have sales data. With
sales data, it is possible to summarize the firm-level price data to an industry price
index. This may be more relevant from a competition policy point of view, especially
if the price index is closely related to measures of consumer surplus. Note that the
pass-on measures in the previous chapter were often closely related to consumer





Given price and cost data (and possibly sales data), the remaining question is how
many of these price and cost observations are required. In principle, one could follow
the prices and costs over an extended period in time. For example, one could collect
annual price and cost data over a period of 30 years. Yet in practice, it is probably
asking too much to obtain the price and cost information dating back thirty years.
When information is available over a more limited historical period, the number of
observations to identify pass-on can be increased by increasing the frequency of the
observations. For example, one could collect quarterly data on prices and cost over the
last 10 years, to have 40 observations to identify pass-on. Similarly, one could gather
monthly data over three years and have 36 observations on prices and costs. One
could increase the number of observations even further by having a higher frequency,
say weekly, but in practice, the informational value of this would depend on the actual78
variation of price and cost data in short intervals. For example, costs and prices for
gasoline prices show a high variation, even within a month, so that a high frequency
of data may provide useful additional information. In contrast, the prices for cars are
typically adjusted by the manufacturers only a few times a year, so that there is
probably little to be gained from increasing the frequency beyond the quarterly level.
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Note also that when one increases the frequency of the data, it may become useful to
specify a dynamic model, which distinguishes between short-run and long-run pass-
on.
In addition to following the price and cost observations over a certain time period,
there is the possibility of ) the data. To see how this works, note that data are
often available at a finer level of detail than at the level of the firm. A firm may sell
different products, in different stores. Suppose that each firm operates in 3 different
product categories and sells in 10 different stores. One could then collect historical
price and cost data to estimate pass-on for each product in each. This would amount to
30 (3 times 10) separate pass-on studies. But alternatively, one could pool the
information on products and stores and construct a large panel data set in three
dimensions: time, stores and product categories. If one is willing to make certain
assumptions, for example that the degree of pass-on is the same across stores and/or
product categories, then one can conduct a single large study of pass-on instead of 30
small ones. By pooling the data, one can thus also try to identify pass-on by
comparing price and cost observations across stores and products, in addition to
following the evolution of price and cost over time. This can greatly increase the
amount of information, so that one does not necessarily have to go back very far in
time. In our example of 3 product categories and 10 stores, the number of
observations can be multiplied by a factor of 30 when one pools the data. For pooling
to be effective it is necessary that prices and costs show enough variation across stores
and product categories, in addition to the previous requirement of sufficient variation
over time.
To summarize, a suitable data set to estimate the extent of pass-on would contain the
following variables for several firms in the industry: prices, (marginal or variable)
costs and (possibly) sales. The information can be collected as a panel data set with
the following dimensions: time, stores and product categories. This information
should be available for many cases.
4.1.2 Actual data
The panel data set collected by Ashenfelter et al. (1998) consisted of the following.
-  There was information on two firms, Staples and Office Depot. Since there was no
information on the other firms, the information on Office Depot was treated as a
good proxy for all other firms.
-  There was information on prices and variable cost.
-  The following dimensions of the panel were included:
-  Time: 24 months during 1995-1996
                                                          
67 Note that, as the frequency of the data is increased, dynamic models that distinguish short term from
long term effects may be necessary.79
-  Stores: 500 stores
-  Product categories, here called “stock keeping units” (SKU): 30 SKUs,
including 17 pens, 7 paper items, 5 toner cartridges and 1 diskette.
The total number of observations in the panel on the prices and costs for both
firms can thus be up to 360000 (24 times 500 times 30).
The analysis in this chapter has made use of an alternative data set on the market for
refrigerated juice. In contrast to Ashenfelter et al. we have only information available
on one supermarket: Dominick’s Finer Foods, one of the two largest retail chains in
Chicago metropolitan area.
68 There are three main brands sold by the retail chain:
Tropicana, Minute Made and the private label. There are 146 different stores and the
brands are sold in many different varieties (called UPCs).
Our panel data set on the refrigerated juice market thus consists of the following:
-  There is information on three brands, Tropicana, Minute Maid and the private
label. The other brands have a negligible share of the market and are ignored (only
11 percent of the market for the remaining brands).
-  There is information on prices, variable cost (measured by the manufacturer price)
and sales.
-  The following dimensions of the panel are included:
-  Time: 218 weeks between 1989-1993.
-  Stores: 146 stores
-  Product categories, here called UPCs: about 200.
The total number of observations in the panel is thus also very large. To keep the
data manageable, we followed Kadiyali et al. (2000) and averaged the data across
stores and across varieties. This reduces the number of observations to only 218
(the number of weeks). It thus appears that we no longer make use of panel data
information, and that all identification of pass-on would become because of
variation in prices and cost over time. Yet this is not the case. Because our price
and cost data are now averages (across store and UPC), the variation across stores
and UPC also plays a role in identifying pass-on.
69 We emphasize that in principle
we could also have followed the same approach as in Ashenfelter et al., yet in
practice it turned out to be more convenient to follow the “averaging approach”.
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This may also be the case in competition policy cases.
The main difference between the application of Ashenfelter et al. and our current
application lies in the ownership structure of the firms. In Ashenfelter et al., two
independent firms are chosen that are competing with each other. In our application,
three brands are considered. At the retail level, the prices of these brands are set
jointly by the retailer, rather than competitively (see Kadiyali et al, 2000). One could
                                                          
68 The data set is maintained by the marketing group at the university of Chicago.
69 In the panel data terminology, we have something resembling a “between-groups” estimator.
70 Otherwise, it would have been necessary to precisely match the product varieties (UPCs) of the
various brands.80
thus view our analysis as complementary to Ashenfelter: we do not focus on the
extent of pass-on of cost changes by competing firms, but rather on the extent of pass-
on of cost savings by brands whose prices are set cooperatively (by the retailer). For
both applications, the same econometric framework can be used.
 

Suppose there are three products, product 1, 2 and 3 and we are interested in studying
pass-on of cost changes into consumer prices. A “traditional” approach would be to
estimate the following basic regression equation for firm 1:
LMW LMW LMW M L LMW     + + + + = γ β α α
1 1 1 .
In this specification, 
1
LMW   is the price charged by product 1 for a product sold in store i,
belonging to product category j at time t. Similarly, 
1
LMW   is the marginal (or variable)
cost incurred by product 1 in store i in product category j at time t. The variable LMW 
measures other factors that may affect the price. The terms  L α ,  M α , 
1 β  and γ are
parameters that are to be estimated using common econometric regression techniques.
For example, the ordinary least squares method (OLS) may be used under certain
assumption.
The parameters  L α  and  M α  are called fixed effects for, respectively, the store i, the
product category j. (Ashenfelter et al. also include a time effect  W α .). It is important to
include them as parameters to be estimated, since they measure the systematic effect
that a store, product category or time period could have on the price. (For example,
one product category can be systematically more expensive than the other product
category.)
The main parameter of interest is 
1 β , which measures pass-on. It may either reflect
absolute or relative pass-on, depending on how the variables are measured. If the price
1
LMW   and the cost 
1
LMW   are measured in monetary units, e.g. in Euros, then 
1 β  measures
absolute pass-on: the effect of an increase in the variable cost by one Euro on the price
in Euros. In contrast, if the price and cost are measured in logarithms, then 
1 β
measures the relative pass-on, or the pass-on elasticity.
Ashenfelter et al. showed that the above specification fails to distinguish between
firm-specific pass-on and industry-wide pas-on. The reason is that the specification
looks at the effects of cost increases by firm 1 on the price charged by firm 1, without
controlling for any possible accompanying cost changes by the other firms. In
practice, this will lead to biased estimates for firm-specific pass-on.
A more general approach is therefore to modify the regression equation and also
include the costs of the other products in the regression, i.e. the variables 
2
LMW   and 
3
LMW  .
In Ashenfelter et al these other products were from the merging partner. Here we







LMW LMW LMW LMW LMW M L LMW       + + + + + + = γ β β β α α
3 3 2 2 1 1 1 (11)
More specifically, one can interpret the parameters as follows:
- 
1 β : This reflects product-specific pass-on: the pass-on of a
cost increase by product 1 on the price of product 1’s
product.
- 
3 2 1 β β β + + : This measures product 1, 2 and 3’s overall pass-on: the
pass-on of a cost increase by product 1, product 2 and
product 3 together on the price of product 1’s product (if
the costs are highly correlated).
As before, the pass-on may be either in absolute terms, or in elasticity form (in
relative terms), depending on whether one measures the prices and costs in monetary
values (Euros) or in logarithms.
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One may easily extend the analysis beyond pass-on by product 1. One can thus also
ask how a cost changes will be passed on to the price of product 2 and product 3. It is
straightforward to formulate similar regression equations for product 2 and 3. To
avoid too much notation, these equations are not shown here.
We now discuss how one can extend beyond the Ashenfelter et al. framework. Instead
of asking what will happen to the individual price of product 1, or product 2 or
product 3, one may wonder what would happen to a composite price index when the
cost of one product (or several products) change. This may indeed be the more natural
question to ask if one is interested in consumer welfare questions relating to the
industry as a whole. In fact, consumer theory has discussed extensively the choice of
an appropriate price index to measure changes in consumer surplus. A detailed
discussion on the choice of an appropriate price index is beyond the scope of this
study. Yet it is fair to say that there is a consensus that one should include
representative basket of related products into the price index, using sales as weights.
In the theoretical discussion on pass-on in the previous chapter the emphasis was also
on what happens to the price level for the industry as a whole.
Suppose the price index for store i of product category j at time t is measured by the
variable 
,
LMW  . Such a price index is typically some weighted average of the prices of




LMW   and 
3
LMW  ), where the weights may be the
                                                          
71 Note that this set-up slightly from Ashenfelter et al. They assumed that only the cost changes of the
other firms should be interpreted to capture firm-specific pass-on, whereas the current framework also
includes the cost change of firm 1 itself.82
sales at a certain base period. Using the price index as the relevant focus it is possible
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,
LMW       + + + + + + = γ β β β α α
3 3 2 2 1 1 (12)
The only difference with the previous regression equation is that one now looks at the
effects of cost changes on the whole price index, rather than on the price of a single
product. We now have the following interpretation of the included parameters:
- 
1 β : Product 1’s specific pass-on into the price index.
- 
2 β : Product 2’s specific pass-on into the price index.
- 
3 β : Product 3’s specific pass-on into the price index.
- 
3 2 1 β β β + + : Product 1, 2 and 3’s overall pass-on.
The above equations (11) and (12) can be estimated directly using the large panel data
set. Alternatively, the data can be averaged across the store and/or the product
category. As discussed in section 4.1.2, in our application we average the observations
across both dimensions of the panel.
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One may of course also estimate the pass-on equations for product 2 and 3’s price.
These equations will be the regression equations to which the data set is applied in the
next section.
                                                          




We have estimated the pass-on regressions with the variables expressed either in
monetary values or in logarithms. The main results are displayed in Table 6.
Table 6. Pass-on of cost changes –
Effect on price of the Private Label, Minute Maid, Tropicana, and the market price index.
level specification logarithmic specification
variable estimate stand. error estimate stand. error





cost MM -0,003 (0,041) -0,014 (0,030)
cost TR -0,044 (0,050) -0,038 (0,050)
Minute Maid constant 0,649 (0,168) 0,523 (0,048)
cost PL -0,135 (0,065) -0,121 (0,049)
cost MM 
 (0,048)  (0,035)
cost TR -0,097 (0,059) -0,108 (0,058)
Tropicana constant -0,354 (0,142) 0,139 (0,035)
cost PL -0,038 (0,055) -0,017 (0,035)





Market price index constant -0,369 (0,157) 0,177 (0,041)
cost PL  (0,061)  (0,042)
cost MM  (0,045)  (0,030)
cost TR  (0,055)  (0,049)
Table 6 shows the estimates of pass-on when cost increases and cost decreases have
symmetric effects on the price (as was implicitly assumed in the empirical framework
of section 4.2). The first twelve rows show the effects of product-specific cost changes
on the price of the private label, Minute Maid, and Tropicana, respectively. They are
based on the specifications (11’). The final four rows show the effect of cost changes
on the general market price index, based on the specification (12’). The first two
columns show the estimates (and standard errors) when all variables are expressed in
monetary values; the final two columns show the estimates when the variables are
expressed in logarithms.
Most relevant for our purposes are the numbers printed in bold. They measure the
product-specific pass-on rate. The other numbers refer to the parameters estimates for
the control variables, namely the competitors’ costs. They are not of immediate
interest, but as was discussed in the previous section, it is necessary to include them as
control variables, since otherwise the parameters of our main interest will be biased.
We begin by discussing the pass-on regressions for the private label, Minute Maid and
Tropicana, as shown in the first twelve rows. These specifications are most
comparable to the one considered by Ashenfelter et al., especially the logarithmic
specification. Consider first the regression for the private label (first four rows), with
the variables in monetary values (levels). It can be seen that a cost increase for the84
private label by one unit would lead to a price increase by 1.493 units.
73 This is thus
the absolute pass-on, which is estimated with a high precision as can be seen from the
low standard error. The effect of the rival firms costs is negligible (insignificantly
negative). The logarithmic specification gives an estimate of the relative pass-on
estimate, or elasticity, namely 1.120. It says that a cost increase for the private label by
one percent would lead to a price increase of 1.12 percent, after controlling for cost
changes for the competing firms.
The pass-on estimates for Minute Maid and Tropicana are shown by the bold numbers
in the next eight rows. The absolute pass-on numbers for Minute Maid and Tropicana
are estimated to be 1.297 and 1.631, respectively. The relative pass-on numbers, or the
pass-on elasticities, are estimated to be 0.945 and 1.275, respectively.
One can conclude from these numbers that product-specific pass-on of cost changes is
considerably larger in this market than in the market considered by Ashenfelter et al.
For example, the product-specific pass-on elasticities are around one, so that pass-on
is roughly complete. This compares to the product-specific pass-on elasticity of
around 0.15, as had been obtained by Ashenfelter et al. One interpretation for this
finding is the different focus of our analysis. Ashenfelter et al. took into account also
cost changes by competing retail chains. In contrast, the analysis here only focuses on
competing brands within the same retail stores. If the prices are set more or less
cooperatively within a retail store (as in Kadiyali et al.), then a higher degree of pass-
through would be reasonable, and also consistent with the theoretical results derived
in the previous chapter. Nevertheless, it is possible that the estimates would go down
if the analysis could also control for the cost increases by a competing retail chain
(which was not feasible in our application because of limited data).
How can one interpret the results in light of the theoretical discussion of chapter 3.2?
To address this question, it is necessary to consider product-specific pass-on with
respect to the market price index, rather than with respect to the individual prices. In
our opinion, this approach is also more appealing from a competition policy point of
view, at least if the market price index is a reasonably good approximation for
consumer surplus. The estimates are shown in the last four rows of Table 6.
Looking at the extent of absolute product-specific pass-on, one can see that a cost
increase for the private label by one unit would lead to a rise in the market price index
by 0.505 units. A cost increase by one unit for Minute Maid would lead to a slightly
lower rise in the market price index (0.488 units), whereas a cost increase by one unit
for Tropicana would have a larger effect (0.549 units). The product-specific pass-on
estimates expressed in relative terms, or the elasticities, are lower. A 1 percent cost
increase for the private label would lead to a general price increase by 0.359 percent,
whereas a 1 percent cost increase for Minute Maid would lead to a general price
increase by only 0.332 percent, and a 1 percent cost increase for Tropicana would lead
to a general price increase by 0.493 percent.
If cost shocks are highly correlated, the sum of these pass-on rates is a rough measure
of the industry-wide pass-on. In absolute terms this amounts to a number of 1.542,
whereas in relative terms it amounts to 1.184. This says that a joint cost change by 1
unit or by percent would lead to a change in the market price index by respectively
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1.542 units and 1.18 percent. This indicates some tendency of overshifting, at least in
absolute terms.
To which extent are these results consistent with the theoretical analysis in the
previous section? First, note that it is confirmed that product-specific pass-on is
smaller than the overall pass-on of all product’s costs.
74 This underscores the
importance of formulating a pass-on regression after controlling for the cost changes
by all firms, if one is interested in an unbiased estimate for product-specific pass-on.
Second, note that product-specific pass-on is the smallest for the products with the
smallest market shares in this example. The average market shares of the private label,
Minute Maid and Tropicana during the sample period were respectively 28.0, 24.8 and
47.2 percent (ignoring the market shares of other brands, which constitute about 10
percent of the sales, see Kadiyali et al. 2000). Tropicana is the firm with the highest
market share and the highest pass-on, especially when expressed in elasticity terms.
The theoretical analysis in section 3.2.3.3 was ambiguous about the role of market
shares, with a tendency of the highest degree of pass-on for intermediate market
shares (see Observation 3.9). The empirical analysis correspondingly provides
important information that theoretical considerations cannot bring.
Third, the overall pass-on estimates in absolute terms indicate a tendency of
overshifting. This appears to be in contradiction with the theory, in particular the
predictions on pass-on with differentiated products, unless if one would assume strong
increasing returns to scale (declining marginal cost curve). For example, Observation
3.7 established that industry-wide pass-on is incomplete in a logit model of product
differentiation. Yet it was also noted that this was dependent on the functional form
assumptions of the logit model, which generate price elasticities that are increasing in
price, or equivalently, markups that are declining in price; under the logit assumptions
firms thus absorb cost changes by adjusting their markups. Under other models of
product differentiation, such as the CES model, markup absorption may be lower (or
absent) so that industry-wide pass-on in absolute terms can be greater than 1. This
application thus shows that since we do not know in general how the elasticity or
markup varies with price, it is better to take an empirical approach and measure the
extent of pass-on.
4.3.2 Extensions
The above analysis of pass-on takes the most stylised form. In merger investigation, it
is desirable to do various extensions so as to confirm the robustness of the results. We
have already pointed out that it would be useful to have information on another retail
chain, in particular if the proposed merger was between two retail chains (in which
case it should not be too difficult to collect the data, as demonstrated by Ashenfelter et
al.). Nevertheless, our analysis may be a reasonable approximation if competition
between retail chains is relatively weak, for example due to consumer search costs.
Our application may also be a reasonable point of departure if one is analysing a
                                                          
74 Note however that this only holds in this application for considering pass-on with respect to the
market price index. As can be confirmed from the first nine rows of the Table, it does not hold for pass-
on with respect to the individual firms’ prices, in contrast to Ashenfelter et al.’s result. This is because
Ashenfelter consider 

 products, whereas we consider products that are priced by the same
firm.86
merger between two manufacturers (say Minute Maid and Tropicana) rather than
between two retail chains.
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Regarding the econometric specification, several possible extensions may be
undertaken. First, it is possible to estimate the model on the full data set, rather than
averaged across stores and product categories. Furthermore, it is possible to consider
other control variables for the reduced form pass-on equation, for example a measure
for the macro-economic state of the economy (GDP, interest rate, etc.). It could also
be possible to introduce dynamics in the analysis, for example by adding lagged price
and cost variables, or by specifying a complete error correction model, which can
distinguish between short-run and long-run effects of cost changes.
Finally, one may consider the role of alternative functional forms. We have already
considered two possible functional form specifications: the linear and the logarithmic
specifications. Note that both functional forms generated comparable measures for
goodness of fit. An R
2 in the range of 0.6-0.75 was obtained for the pass-on
regressions on the individual prices; an R
2 of around 0.5 was obtained for the pass-on
regressions on the market price index, whether one consider the linear or the
logarithmic functional form. A further extension is to consider the role of asymmetries
in pass-on regarding cost increases and cost decreases. We have considered this
possibility in Table 7, for the linear case (The results for the logarithmic case are
analogous).
Table 7. Pass-on regressions with possible asymmetries
level specification
estimate stand. Error
Private Label constant -0,091 0,144
cost PL 
 0,062
cost PL up  0,015
cost MM 0,006 0,042
cost MM up
cost TR -0,031 0,051
cost TR up
Minute Maid constant 0,675 0,167




cost MM up  0,020
cost TR -0,082 0,059
cost TR up
Tropicana constant -0,196 0,153
cost PL -0,050 0,055
cost PL up




cost TR up  0,013
Whole Market constant -0,475 0,170
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cost PL 
 0,069
cost PL up 
 0,016
cost MM  0,055
cost MM up 
 0,019
cost TR  0,068
cost TR up  0,015
The interpretation of Table 7 is similar as in the previous Table the new parameters
are the parameters related to the cost “up” variables. These parameters indicate
whether there is a different effect on prices (in absolute terms) when costs go up, than
when costs go down. In merger analysis, the relevant estimates refer to what would
happen to prices when costs go  (since the claims by the parties concern
efficiencies rather than inefficiencies). We limit our discussion here to the last eight
rows; the discussion for the other results straightforwardly generalizes the previous
Table. One can see that a one unit cost decrease by the private label would decrease
the price by 0.518. In contrast, a one unit cost increase has a smaller effect: it would
increase the price by only 0.518 – 0.014 = 0.504 units. Note, however, that the
difference is not significant. Similarly, for Minute Maid and Tropicana the effects of
cost increases are somewhat less pronounced than for decreases, though the effects are
not significant. In sum, this extension would indicate that the pass-on estimates
remain more or less robust whether or not one allow pass-on to differ when the effect
of cost increases is allowed to differ from the effect of cost decreases.
 
 	
The above empirical analysis illustrates how an analysis of pass-on can be
implemented in practice. The analysis complements the original work of Ashenfelter
et al. They demonstrate that relatively simple regressions can be estimated, to measure
firm-specific pass-on using data on price and variable firm-specific costs to be
provided by the two merging firms. We extended the analysis to include other
products sold by the same firm to account for the multiproduct nature of the firm.
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Our analysis was done in the context of retailing. Note that this has also implications
for analysing mergers by (upstream) firms in manufacturing. If two upstream firms
merge, one should not simply ask to which extent these firms will pass-on cost
savings into the wholesale prices charged to the downstream retailers. One should also
ask whether these downstream retailers will pass-on the changed wholesale prices
onto the final consumer prices.
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These problems are not likely to be present with an actual merger investigation, since then one can
request data by the competing merging firms.88
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